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Abstract 
This article analyzes the economics of “badmouthing” in the context of the pre-1914 French 
capital market. We argue that badmouthing was a means through which racketeering journals 
sought to secure property rights over issuers’ reputation. We provide a theoretical study of the 
market setup that emerged to deal with such problems, and we test our predictions using new 
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This article analyzes the economics of “badmouthing” in the context of the pre-1914 French 
capital market. We argue that badmouthing was a means through which racketeering journals 
sought to secure property rights over issuers’ reputation. We provide a theoretical study of the 
market setup that emerged to deal with such problems, and we test our predictions using new 
evidence from contemporary sources. 
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 ―A newspaper that wishes to make its fortune should never waste its columns and 
weary its readers by praising anything. Eulogy is invariably dull 
—a fact that Mr Alf had discovered and utilized‖ 
A. Trollope, The Way We Live Now, 1875 
 
―And did you threaten him with the newspapers?‖ 
H. de Balzac, La maison Nucingen, 1837 
 
Introduction 
Benjamin  Franklin  wrote that  ―glass, china and reputation are easily cracked and  never  well  mended‖.
1 
Anyone with a brand or public name is concerned with the costs of denigration by the press, because reputation 
is  a  source  of  rents.  Libel  laws  exist  to  protect  reputation,  but—by  the  time  compensation  is  obtained—
irrecoverable  losses  have  been  incurred.  Once  a  journal  has  made  false  allegations,  they  linger  with  every 
subsequent mention of the libeled party despite efforts to publicize any court rulings that may have been secured. 
This means that journals own a claim on (say) an equity issuers‘ reputation, because reputation pretty much what 
the press makes of it. This externality cannot be easily addressed—nor can it be insured against, given the built-
in moral hazard. Furthermore, there is a trade-off between libel law and freedom of speech. Full freedom of 
speech gives more people the opportunity to speak the truth; but this also creates the problems described here as 
it becomes harder to secure protection from being denigrated. 
―Badmouthing‖  is  a  serious  challenge  to  brands,  which  modern  theory  suggests  play  a  valuable  role  in 
resolving  informational  asymmetries  and,  more  generally,  disciplining  markets.  By  generating  revenue  and 
providing future rewards, brands discipline short-term tendencies to renege and cheat. Yet because reputation is 
valuable, it is possible to turn denigration, defamation, or badmouthing into an instrument of racket. Brand 
owners will sacrifice revenues to prevent damaging rumors (in fact, they are prepared to pay as much as the 
value of rents accruing to their brand, net of investment costs). Thus the value from brand ownership is reduced, 
as are the positive effects that brands can have. 
How do markets respond to the risk of badmouthing? This is the topic of our paper. Badmouthing is an 
idiomatic term that refers to saying negative things about someone or something. As used here, this term covers 
the threat to print negative things (for extortion purposes) as well as the implementation of such threats. The 
badmouthing  racket  is  different  from  blackmail.  Blackmail  is  legally  defined  as  the  criminal  offense  of 
attempting to extort money by threats of exposure of a crime or disreputable conduct. Badmouthing is another 
type of extortion: whereas the blackmailer sells true information that she has come across or worked to uncover, 
the denigrating agent is selling information that he has fabricated. In other words, badmouthing is produced at 
zero cost. Hence we must emphasize the contrast between badmouthing and blackmailing. Because blackmailing 
tends to check wrongful behavior, not all economists agree that it should be punished. Some point out that a 
journal blackmailing a firm is comparable to the trader who shorts a stock based on insider information.
2 
The problems raised by badmouthing are of a different kind. In particular, badmouthing is based on making 
things up. Because they have a readership, journals are well positioned to promote such fabrication. They need 
not actually  make allegations (since  these could run afoul of libel law); rather, a journal  need only imply, 
suggest, or let it be understood that something is wrong. The rumor can then grow on the premise that, as the old 
                                                            
1 Quoted in Whiting, Early American Proverbs  , p. 176. 
2 See Coase, ―Blackmail‖; and Ginsburg and Shechtman, ―Blackmail,‖ for the view that blackmail ought to be illegal in order 
to economize resources. This point is disputed by libertarian authors; see e.g. Block, Kinsella, and Hoppe, ―Second Paradox.‖ 
See Gómez and Ganuza, ―Civil and Criminal Sanctions,‖ for a more recent discussion.   4 
saying goes, ―where there‘s smoke, there‘s fire‖. Some situations are especially conducive to such denigration: 
firms accessing financial markets (via IPOs), experiencing financial difficulties, or selling risky technology are 
easy  targets.  In  a  society  where  freedom  of  speech  prevails,  badmouthing—provided  it  can  be  given  some 
substance—is hard to distinguish from the free expression of negative views. 
One  thing  that  makes  detection  of  badmouthing  so  difficult  is  that  revenues  may  be  secured  in  many 
different, legally admissible ways. Historians have pointed out that several racketeering cases did not involve 
open accusations. When a borrower (country or corporate) came under focus, some journals could suspend 
reporting on it. If it was the official policy of these journals that concern could be communicated by lack of 
coverage, then silence could amount to criticism.
3 It is argued that these circumstances could serve to coerce the 
―embargoed‖ agents to approach journals about actually paying for coverage. Apropos here are the more recent 
accusations made against rating agencies. Many are concerned that issuers are bullied into ―legal‖ ways of 
paying bribes to financial analysts working in the press. In the past, these ways have included coercing the issuer 
into buying ads, purchasing a rating, or more generally subscribing to a service provided by the analyst. A 
recurring  claim  against  rating  agencies  during  the  late  nineteenth  century  (when  they  were  known  as 
―mercantile‖ agencies) was that firms who refused to subscribe would receive poor ratings.
4 In the twenty-first 
century, Hannover Re (a German insurer) charged that Moody‘s had tried to force it to purchase a rating and that 
the  insurer‘s  resistance  to  this  racket  is  why  Moody‘s  subsequently  reported  an  unsolicited  negative  rating 
(Hannover Re claimed that two other rating agencies it had employed reported a favorable outlook).
5 
In this article, we use a variety of theoretical insights and an entirely new database to address the following 
questions: Given that badmouthing is so easy to perform and that enforcement of rules against it is so difficult, 
why isn’t badmouthing more widespread? Can potential victims manage, at least partly, to address this problem? 
We explore these questions in the context of the French financial press during the period 1870–1914. France was 
by no means exceptional, and a similar study could just as well be performed for other countries. But there are 
three reasons for choosing this period and place as a case study. First, as a result of the Law of 1881, the freedom 
of the press was complete. It provided free speech and guaranteed free entry. Historians hail it as France’s ―First 
Amendment‖.
6 Our situation is therefore as close as possible to a ―natural experiment‖ in which legal attempts to 
control denigration were at a minimum. Second, the period is usually portrayed as being rife with defamatory 
rackets  and  related  abuses  by  the  press  against  banks,  borrowing  governments,  and  firms.  Contemporary 
accounts  give  details  regarding  the  various  techniques  employed.  Marinitsch  and    Lajeune-Vilar  provide 
concurring  descriptions.
7  Graphic and informative details are also  known from  L’Humanit￩  (a  communist 
newspaper), which published between December 1923 and March 1924 material showing Russian authorities 
                                                            
3 For example, one financial newspaper (Messager de Paris) told readers that they ought to ―read between [the] lines‖ and 
understand that in some cases ―no report is equivalent to a forceful blame‖; quoted in Albert, ―La presse fran￧aise,‖ p. 172. 
Bignon and Miscio, ―Media Bias,‖ report evidence of information suppression. 
4 In the words of one observer: ―What [mercantile agencies] desire is to drive the man within their own inclosure, and force 
him to become a subscriber to their institution.‖ Brooklyn Eagle, ―Agencies,‖ 15 November 1873, p. 2. 
5 Alec Klein, ―Credit Raters’ Power Leads to Abuses, Some Borrowers Say,‖ Washington Post, 24 November 2004. More 
recently, the Wall Street Journal reported on a Moody’s employee who claimed to have been sacked for seeking an upgrade 
for Express Scripts (a corporation). The employee’s supervisor is said to have argued that ―Express Scripts doesn’t pay us,‖ 
and ―they don’t visit us and they don’t deserve our upgrade‖ (Jennifer Levitz, ―Moody's Sued in Ratings Case,‖ Wall Street 
Journal, 26 March 2009). Such tactics may be viewed as a type of greenmail. Greenmail consists of acquiring shares in a 
company and then threatening to use them in a hostile way unless they are repurchased above market price. There is no need 
to make overt threats (the target firm usually deciphers the message) and so abuse is hard to document. 
6 Albert, ―La presse fran￧aise.‖ 
7 Lajeune-Vilar, Les coulisses; Marinitsch, La Bourse   5 
being coerced to pay nearly 5 million pre-WWI FF (1 million pre-WWI USD) to the French press between 1904 
and 1907. (Here ―FF‖ denotes ―French francs‖; ―USD‖, ―U.S. dollars‖.) The third reason is that, despite these 
payments, the Paris financial market strove to become one of the most important international capital markets in 
the world—second only to London. Paris’ market capitalization as a share of GDP was close to 100 percent, and 
Paris  was  a  serious  competitor  against  London  for  foreign  government  debt.
8  The  implication  is  that 
badmouthing had been, to some extent, subdued. How this was achieved is the topic of our article. 
Other modern papers have examined the impact of a free press on corruption and quality. Gentzkow, Glaeser, 
and Goldin argue that the rise of the informative press in the nineteenth-century United States was the result of 
technological  progress  and  free  entry.
9  Petrova  argues  that  higher  advertising  revenues  favored  media 
independence.
10 McMillan and Zoido show how independent media created the opportunity for Peru to prevent a 
corrupt government from remaining in power.
11 Dyck, Volchkova, and Zingales study the role of the media in 
disciplining firms.
12  Besley and Prat show how competition can reduce  media capture by government.
13 
Gentzkow and Shapiro argue that , when media compete on the basis of reputation,  slanting (i.e., providing 
biased information) is reduced if consumers can easily learn the ―true‖ information.
14 The ability of editors or 
journalists to appropriate private benefits from their position is studied in Djankov et al. and Baron.
15 
In this literature, the press is considered to be helpful in  monitoring managers and policy makers and in 
diminishing the number of frauds; a free press is expected to tell the truth and is more likely to report 
wrongdoings. Our paper takes a slightly different perspective. We examine the full logic of a complete free-press 
regime and find that it complicates the court enforcement of libel cases. We have already remarked that, from an 
empirical standpoint, it is difficult to distinguish ill -intentioned badmouthing from its honest, merely ―critical‖, 
variant. The difference between our approach and previous studies is best stated in terms of the difference 
between what statisticians call Type I and Type II errors.
16 The current literature deals with truth in the market 
for news. It is therefore concerned with Type I er rors, or with the risk that true facts remain concealed. We are 
concerned with Type II errors, or with the risk that false (and harmful) claims are circulated as truthful. 
Statistical theory shows that there is a relation between the incidence of Type I and Type II errors. Increasing the 
stringency of libel law (raising the cost of defamation) reduces Type II errors but increases the risk of not 
recognizing the truth (Type I errors). This explains why it may be optimal to tolerate a certain degree of 
defamation. We do not address here the normative issue of the  optimal amount of libel punishment.
17 We do 
provide a positive study of the endogenous emergence of market solutions to contain denigration. Toward this 
end, France‘s pre-1914 regime of complete freedom of speech is a valuable test case. 
This article explores how the market mechanism dealt with the risk of badmouthing. For this purpose we use 
empirical evidence on the organization of the French press and on a major defamatory racket. Note that certain 
media specialized in disinformation and racketeering. These were the smaller and less reputable journals, which 
we refer to as ―bad‖ or ―zombie‖ journals, that were called (or recalled) to life solely to wage a press campaign 
                                                            
8 Rajan and Zingales, ―Great Reversals― 
9 Gentzkow, Glaeser, and Goldin, ―Rise of the Fourth Estate.‖ 
10 Petrova, ―Newspapers and Parties‖. 
11 McMillan and Zoido, ―How to Subvert‖. 
12 Dyck, Volchkova, and Zingales, ―Corporate Governance Role‖. 
13 Besley and Prat, ―Handcuffs.‖ 
14 Gentzkow and Shaipro, ―Media Bias.‖ 
15 Djankov et al., ―Who owns‖; Baron, ―Persistent Media Bias‖. 
16 These refer (respectively) to the error of rejecting a correct hypothesis and the error of accepting a incorrect one. 
17 Garoupa, ―Dishonesty‖; Bar-Gill and Hamdani "Optimal Liability"; Dalvi and Refalo, 2008. "Economic Analysis‖.   6 
and then were sent to rest by their proprietors. Our first finding is that, because they were small and lacked 
reputation, these bad journals had to solve a collective action problem: they were only really dangerous when 
they coordinated their attacks. Our second finding is that, while bad journals had an incentive to become more 
organized, their targets had an incentive to organize themselves in order to contain potential ill effects. To 
control the damages of badmouthing, institutions concerned with reputation (e.g., corporations, underwriting 
banks,  governments)  put  together  quasi-formal  intermediaries,  known  as  ―publicity  brokers‖,  who  acted  as 
delegated monitors and replaced bilateral sanctions with multilateral, intertemporal ones. 
A third finding concerns the implications of our theory for the funding of journals. We show that charging 
borrowers (information providers) was a complement to—not a substitute for—charging investors (information 
seekers). The reason is that the risk of bad publicity induces targets to seek press coverage from more prestigious 
sources  of  information.  In  other  words,  the  best  insurance  against  badmouthing  by  bad  journals  is 
―goodmouthing‖ by good ones: publicity of this type serves as an insurance premium (and this is how the 
practice was described at the time).
18 But then, as space in good journals becomes scarce, these journals can 
begin to charge information providers. Thus the threat of badmouthing may be viewed as the solution to the free-
rider problem that underlies any provision of high -quality information as a public good: not only investors but 
also borrowers are interested in this information. We suspect that this analysis can go a long way toward solving 
the puzzle of why rating agencies, which began as publishers that charged only the purchasers of   their 
―manuals‖, switched to a regime where also the borrowers were charged.
19 Proposals suggesting that agencies 
should now switch back to the former regime miss an important aspect of the current setup: it is a natural market 
outcome and, in many respects, a desirable one.
20 
A corollary of this logic is the risk of capture. Good media are in a strong bargaining position with respect to 
institutions  that  are  concerned  about  their  reputations.  Because  such  journals  can  easily  apply  ―soft‖ 
badmouthing  (e.g.,  providing  coverage  only  on  certain,  select  institutions),  they  are  able  to  overcharge 
reputation-concerned institutions. In other words, the threat of badmouthing provides more serious journals with 
de facto property rights over agents‘ reputations. The extent to which the situation is costly or damaging depends 
critically on the degree to which free entry prevails in the market for good media. This result highlights the 
difficult balancing act between competition and monopoly power by private certifiers of reputation—issues at 
the heart of discussions about rating agencies‘ role in the recent subprime crisis.
21 
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides stylized facts on badmouthing in France 
before World War I. We survey the legal background (and contrast it to Great Britain‘s), provide canonical 
examples of badmouthing, describe the industrial organization of financial journals, and document the rise of 
what we call a zombie press. We also document an association between the extent of badmouthing and IPO 
activity in the Paris Stock Exchange. Section II provides a theory of badmouthing and derives a number of 
testable implications. This theory is eclectic in that it relies on several strands of literature and does not build on 
a single family of insights. The key contributions made here are introducing the role of quality signals, the 
relation  between  price  (ability  to  charge  readers)  and  longevity,  the  two-sided  aspect  of  markets  (i.e.,  the 
complementarity of prices and advertising revenues), and the role of competition in checking badmouthing and 
                                                            
18 Modiano, La presse pourrie, p. xi. 
19 See Cantor and Packer, ―Credit Rating Industry‖; Smith and Ingo, ―Rating Agencies‖; Byoun and Shin, ―Unsolicited Credit 
Ratings.‖ 
20 A contemporary discussion of feasible charging structures can be found in Raffalovich, L’abominable v￩nalit￩, p. 207. 
21 Mathis, McAndrews and Rochet, ―Rating the raters‖, White, ―Credit Rating Agencies‖.   7 
―nonmouthing‖ (or, as we call it, the rating agency racket). Section III provides evidence: using new data from 
previously  unused  sources,  we  establish  results  that  are  consistent  with  several  of  the  critical  predictions 
underlying our description of the market for fabricated news. We end with conclusions and extensions. Our 
analysis has broader implications for the funding of a high-quality press (a public good), and we review possible 
challenges to the public provision of reliable information. 
 
Section I. Stylized Facts about Badmouthing 
A. Libel Law and the Era of Journalistic Freedom in France (1871–1914) 
The period we study is usually portrayed as the heyday of journalistic freedom in France, which historians 
associate with the landmark Law of 1881. Two distinct aspects of legal constraints on the press have been 
discussed. On the one hand were direct political constraints (censorship, nicknamed Anastasie), which were tight 
under Second Empire (1851–1870) but gradually softened towards the last years of the period.
22 It is also said 
that substantial freedom prevailed for economic and business matters. The advent of the Republic in the early 
1870s ushered in an era of relaxed supervision. The re was also pressure for lax implementation of libel laws, 
which was due to political activism by the left-of-center Radicaux. When this party won the elections of 1876, a 
debate ensured over  giving full  freedom to the press. The judiciary,  which  was  never fully independent  in 
France, reacted by softening the implementation of existing libel laws in anticipation of the full formal freedom 
of the press granted by the landmark Law of 1881. 
The new law severely checked the ability of the executive to control the content of newspapers,
23 and it 
abolished all remaining types of entry cost, authorization, and registration. Finally, the law transferred cases 
pertaining to libel and freedom of the press from  correctionnelle tribunals, which were ruled by professional 
judges who could be influenced by the executives, to assises courts—that is, popular juries. Historians have 
emphasized that the new statute of 1881 (described as France‘s ―First Amendment‖) encouraged a violence of 
language that was unmatched in other countries. (Later on, continued pressure by MPs from the left and the 
center sustained the existing legislation with few qualifications—against pornography and anarchism—in the 
1890s.)
24 One leading history of the period summarizes the situation as follows: ―Offences retained [in the Law 
of 1881] were few and narrowly defined so as to remove any leeway from the executive…. This legal impunity, 
combined with a de facto impunity as to defamation and insults to individuals, along with the difficulty to 
enforce the right to rectification for authorities and the right to answer for individuals had the effect of endowing 
the French press with a total freedom of speech and criticism, but also to permit, in both writing and attacks, a 
frightening degree of violence.‖
25 
A useful comparison of France‘s regime is with that of Britain.
26 By the end of the century the two countries 
had done away with stamp duties and other market entry restrictions, but they differed as far as libel law was 
concerned. Britain was ruled by the Campbell Act of 1843, which had a strong anti-badmouthing bias. First, it 
                                                            
22 Palmer, Des petits journaux,; Albert, ―La presse fran￧aise.‖ 
23 For a classic discussion, see Albert, ―La presse fran￧aise.‖ 
24 The libel and insult cases declined steadily with the passing of the new legislation from 6.9 to 3.2 convicted per 100,000 
inhabitants between 1881 and 1911. In 1872, 3,898 people were accused of libeling or insulting othe rs in the press and 2682 
were convicted. In 1911 those numbers have decreased to 1,871 and 1,344 respectively. Plaintiffs faced delays and 
uncertainties (popular juries made outcomes less predictable).  The proportion of convictions fluctuated around 70 per cent. 
See appendix A.1. for detailed evolution and sources. 
25 Albert, ―La presse fran￧aise,‖ p. 243. 
26 See Koss, Rise and Fall, for an account of the British experience.   8 
provided substantially higher penalties for malicious libels that were known be false, versus ―plain‖ libel (the 
former provided for up to three years‘ imprisonment, including hard labor; the latter was capped at one year in 
an ordinary prison). Second, the Act punished attempts at racketeering—threatening to publish a libel (or to 
abstain from publishing anything) with intent to extort money or any other private benefit (appointment, office, 
etc.)—with forced labor for up to three years.
27 Third, the ―defense of truth‖, which gave defendants in libel 
cases the right to prove the truth of their accusation, was limited to cases where publication of the libel was in 
the ―public benefit‖. Finally, those defendants convicted of libel had to bear the plaintiff‘s legal expenses. 
No such bias existed in France. The Law of 1881 certainly did not introduce higher penalties for libels known 
to be false. Under its provisions, penalties for libel were also smaller than those prevailing in Britain for a similar 
tort (up to six months or one year, depending on the violation). Finally, France‘s Law of 1881 (Article 35) 
allowed the defense of truth to be used against directors or board members of industrial, commercial, or financial 
enterprises making public offerings in the market.
28 This meant that one could print any insulting or denigrating 
statement at all—provided it was based on ―facts‖. As a result, previous work has suggested that the pre-1914 
regime in France had more than its share of badmouthing. A substantial contemporary and subsequent literature 
discussed what seems to be a sad exception française.
29 A classic theme among social historians is that tighter 
libel laws in Britain  led to the early disappearance of duels in Britain and their continuation in France.
30 In 
French literary and political circles, duels were a way to deal with badmouthing; in fact, some leading journals 
had in-house facilities to train for fencing.
31 The early years of the  Annuaire de la presse, the main statistical 
source for information on journals, also reported on the ―most important duels‖. Yet risking one‘s life to defend 
a reputation may have been too chivalrous a deed for bankers and businessmen, who are rarely found among the 
casualties of famous duels.
32 
B. Badmouthing in Practice: Examples 
To define badmouthing, we start with three illustrations. Lajeune-Vilar tells the ―typical story‖ of a low-cost 
stove maker whose product is involved in an accident (carbon monoxide intoxication, causing the death of a 
customer).
33 Journalists take advantage of the situation to threaten the entrepreneur with press coverage unless he 
buys  their  silence.  Lajeune -Vilar  emphasizes  that  the  stove  in  question  was  no  more  dangerous  than 
competitors‘, but journalists could write a story that implied this brand was less reliable. Faced with the threat of 
bad coverage and a resulting decline in sales, the entrepreneur coughed up. This is the essence of a badmouthing 
racket. Strictly speaking, there is nothing ―false‖ in reporting a deadly accident as news. But clearly this could be 
done in a disingenuous way that enables the journal to appropriate some benefit. The concepts of ―blackmailing‖ 
                                                            
27 ―An Act to Amend the Law respecting defamatory words and libel,‖ CAP.  XCVI, Anno Sexto & Septimo, Victoriae 
Reginae. 
28  ―La  v￩rit￩  des  imputations  diffamatoires  et  injurieuses  pourra  ￪tre  ￩galement  ￩tablie  contre  les  directeurs  ou 
administrateurs de toute entreprise industirelle, commerciale ou financi￨re, faisant publiquement appel à l’￩pargne ou au 
cr￩dit‖ (Law of 1881, Article 35). 
29 Contemporary accounts may be found in  Robert-Coutelle, Le Crédit Foncier; Marinitsch, La bourse; Lajeune-Vilar, Les 
coulisses; Lysis, Contre l’oligarchie; Neymarck, Finances; Raffalovich, L’abominable v￩nalité. Key contributions by French 
historians include Albert, ―La presse fran￧aise‖; Jeanneney, ―La v￩nalit￩‖; Eveno, L’argent. 
30 Simpson, ―Dandelions on the Field of Honour‖  
31 Duels were legal, and killing one’s opponent did not entail penalties if the conventions were scrupulously respected 
(number  and  qualification  of  witnesses,  rules  for  choosing  weapons,  etc).  Some  senior  journalists  and  politicians  were 
reported to have made their career from threatening badmouthers with duels. 
32 The two instances we found in Dujardin’s 1891 Annuaire du duel occurred in 1880 and 1882. All told, there were 38 duels 
in 1880 and 58 in 1882. The 1880 duel opposed Arthur Meyer, director of Le Gaulois, to the banker Gaston Dreyfus. When 
Meyer is wounded, the fight is stopped as won. But Meyer, having been insulted by Mr. Lange (another banker) while 
fighting Dreyfus, challenges Lange to a duel. Lange refuses, claiming he does not care about being ―killed‖ in the press. 
33 Lajeune-Vilar, Les coulisses, pp. 45ff   9 
and ―slanting‖ do not really apply to this type of situation. Here the stove maker is a victim, not a wrongdoer. As 
for the journalist, his oblique coverage of the truth is not intended to inform readers so much as to appropriate 
private gains. 
A famous instance of the badmouthing racket is an episode involving a Russian government representative in 
Paris  (Arthur  Raffalovich).  As  revealed  by  his  correspondence  published  during  the  1920s  by  the  French 
Communist Party (with help from the Soviet government), the French press had extracted substantial resources 
from the Czarist regime. This scheme‘s point of departure was Japan‘s surprise attack on Russia‘s Pacific fleet at 
Port Arthur on 8 February 1904; so began the Russo-Japanese War, which Japan would eventually win. Russia‘s 
situation was comparable to that of the stove maker. Its debt burden was moderate and its track record was 
impeccable—hence, financially speaking, there was not much to report upon.
34 But Russia was involved in a 
difficult war that it was not winning, and large portions of its external debt were held in the portfolio of Western 
(here, French) investors. Any press accounts suggesting that Russia was ―living beyond its means‖ or ―on the 
―breaking point‖ would create a sensation. Moreover, Russia had many enemies that were prepared to subsidize 
and thus spread rumors.
35 Articles printed abroad and paid for by foreign powers could be picked up by local 
journals at zero cost, resulting in still more coverage with negative outlook. Like the stove maker, Russia had no 
choice but to forestall bad press with money and bribes. In one letter, a demoralized Russian agent Raffalovich 
called French journals ―hideously venal‖ (in French, l’abominable vénalité de la presse)—an expression that 
would stick. 
The contemporary press offers literally hundreds of instances of badmouthing rackets. Consider the example 
of Semaine economique et financière, a financial weekly. On 22 January 1912 this journal ran a story about the 
Banque Suisse et Française, which was raising capital in Paris. The story‘s language suggested that investors 
should be cautious. No clear statement or allegation was made; rather, the story made reference to a ―troubled 
past‖ and to the bank‘s being less ―Swiss-French‖ than ―German-French‖ and, in fact, ―more German than 
French‖ (the journal inferred this from the names of directors). Of course, in the pre-1914 climate, being ―more 
German than French‖ was tantamount to being owned by the enemy. The story claimed that the journal—unlike 
other newspapers that ―knew nothing but praise‖—felt ―compelled‖ to forewarn readers and that one ―could 
never be too prudent‖. The article concluded with an ominous warning that they would ―soon‖ give more details. 
With this story, the journal was exploiting the libel law‘s ―loophole‖: making statements that were literally true 
but hiding its racket behind the Article 35 provision that any true facts could be published if they concerned 
companies that were taking public subscriptions. Of course, no further details were ever given, and it is easy to 
imagine what transpired thereafter.
36 
These cases have in common a number of features. First, the rumor is cheap because it is not based on 
information that is costly to originate. Second, the attempt at circulating a rumor takes place precisely when the 
target is most vulnerable: immediately after an accident involving a household product, or when the target is 
about to need capital market access (to finance a war or to fund a capital increase). Finally, the allegation cannot 
be refuted in court because it is literally ―true‖: this stove was involved in an accident; Russians were actually 
                                                            
34 As Raffalovich (L’abominable v￩nalit￩, p. 407) complained in one letter: ―we [Russia] are not in the same situation as 
Argentina, Brazil‖. Russia would default some years later, but this was after straining its finances in the First World War and 
undergoing a political revolution. 
35 These enemies included outside political rivals (such as Germany), domestic opponents to the Czar’s autocratic rule, and 
international lobbies trying to protect oppressed Jewish minorities (see Miliukov, Russia and its crisis).  
36 The association between rackets and IPOs is emphasized in  Lajeune-Vilar (Les Coulisses, pp. 33–34) and in an article 
published by Le Globe, 11 November 1909, p. 858.   10 
attacked by Japan and lost part of their fleet; and the Banque Suisse et Française did have directors with German 
names. 
C. Payments, Intermediaries, and Participants 
Various vehicles were used to pay journalists, and there were no legal provisions against such payments. 
Marinitsch, and Lajeune-Vilar all argue that some financial journalists received monthly stipends.
37 Another 
technique was the distribution of stock options.
38 Neymarck, who was both an economist and the director of a 
leading financial journal (Le rentier), describes the promotion of initial public offerings in newspapers through 
advertisements, paid articles, and distribution of stock options as part of the normal process ―in France and 
abroad‖.
39 Buying space in journals was another avenue. A preferred way to do this was to publish massive 
amount of technical information on bonds (e.g., announcements of the drawings of lottery bonds). For instance, 
during  1905–1906  Le  rentier  devoted  an  average  of  two  pages  (out  of  sixteen)  to  information  on  Russian 
bonds—all paid for by Russian authorities.
40 Similarly, banks had voluminous announcements regarding their 
services, deposit rates, provision of safes, et  cetera published in journals; they even had transcripts of board 
meetings printed. Anecdotal evidence mentions other creative ways of channeling money to the press, such as 
interest-free loans (to journal directors) that were never reimbursed.
41 
All available accounts suggest that every journal was involved in one way or another. They also suggest that 
any entrepreneur had to expect, whenever some new project was launched, the visit of many individuals coming 
with offers of ―help‖ that thinly disguised badmouthing threats. These accounts also imply that the precise forms 
in which such rackets were carried out varied according to the journal‘s standing. Journals with a relatively high 
reputation were said to attract revenues through publicity, and Lysis actually calls publicity a ―gentlemanly form 
of racket‖.
42 Outright threats of badmouthing were the hunting preserve of journalist-thugs. Contemporaries 
explain that financial gossip could be acquired in a spot where rumormongers were known to congregate. The 
spot was located under the péristyle of the stock exchange (a colonnade on the side of the Paris Bourse) ―in front 
of Notre Dame des Victoires street‖.
43 The place‘s nickname—Académie nationale de chant—was a hard-to-
translate joke that implied this was where the country‘s blackmailers received officially sanctioned training: faire 
chanter is slang for blackmailing (the National Academy of Blackmail is a possible rendering). Once a racketeer 
had found his rumor and prey, he needed only to fabricate a journal. Printers tended to this by offering, at very 
low cost (close to the price of the paper on which it was printed), ready-made four-page journals with cheap 
news inside, which they took from a variety of open sources.
44 The printer would leave it up to the racketeer to 
provide the information for the front page. Thus was a ―journal‖ created. The next stage was the newsboys 
hawking it in the street. 
An interesting and not well-understood aspect of the industrial organization of badmouthing is the existence 
                                                            
37 Marinitsch, La bourse, p. 296; Lajeune-Vilar, Les coulisses, p. 62 
38 Lajeune-Vilar, Les coulisses, p. 51; D’Avenel, ―Le mécanisme‖, p. 643. 
39 Neymarck, Les coulisses, pp. 63–64, 66. 
40 Authors’ own estimates. 
41 A file (box B3323) in the archives of a leading deposit bank —the Société Générale—indicates that it made a loan to M. 
Chavanon,  director  of  L’Information.  A  few  years  later,  when  the  department  for  judicial  affairs  tried  to  secure 
reimbursement, Chavanon simply ignored the request. Documents show that the bank manager ordered the lawyers to stop 
asking for repayment, which suggests that Chavanon had paid a visit to the bank’s management. 
42 Lysis, Les coulisses, p. 48. 
43 Lajeune-Vilar, Les coulisses, p. 53. The péristyle, a colonnade that surrounds the Paris stock exchange, protected against 
the weather and enabled anybody to meet in any season. 
44 Lajeune-Vilar, Les coulisses.   11 
of racket intermediaries, which were called upon by the target prey to distribute monies.
45 Even though there 
could have existed direct  relations—especially between major borrowers or banks and major press outlets, a 
huge share of payments to the press appear to have been managed by publicity brokers. These ―racket brokers‖ 
were described as agents de publicité financière (dealers in financial advertising). No study was ever made of 
publicity brokers, and none of their own material survives. However, these brokers invariably appear in archives 
related to press racketeering during the period as well as in secondhand accounts. Police monitored them, and 
police archives contain interesting (albeit fragmentary) material.
46 Secondary accounts describe a world where 
contracts are never written and wh ere publicity brokers, who centralized the distribution of bribes, reign 
supreme.
47 
Despite monitoring these activities, the police did not interfere. This suggests that the executive branch of 
government was involved and that there was a tacit agreement to  support this arrangement. Indeed, government 
officials were sometimes found among racketeers.  At a broader level, the total freedom of the press made 
journals ideal vehicles for laundering political bribes: compelling a target to buy ads in a journal was  legal, 
whereas  payments  without  counterpart  services  were  not.
48  Lefébure  remarks  that  when  tax  inspectors 
performing audits came across a line that read ―publicity‖ or ―press‖, they ―smiled and moved on‖.
49 This, he 
indicates, means that bureaucrats avoided digging too deeply into such matters because it carried the risk of 
leading them straight to the executive. 
In the Russian bribery case, Russia‘s agent Raffalovich was first approached by the head of the Paris Stock 
Exchange and then called by senior civil servants from the finance ministry‘s staff. Later on, senior members of 
the stock exchange tried to influence Raffalovich‘s list of journals to be bribed, and it seems reasonable to 
conclude from the available evidence that this list included clients and political friends. There is also evidence of 
operations whereby senior politicians instructed Russians to pay certain journals, who then used the bribe monies 
to buy votes in parliament.
50 Finally, Lysis claims that there existed a co zy relation between publicity brokers 
and politicians—with the latter, in effect, supporting the former: 
The publicity brokers are not poor shameful agents working in the shadow, they are officials, they are 
treated well, they receive distinctions, they represent a social function. These agents of corruption have 
close  links  with  ministers,  they  have  access  to  their  office.  The  government  gives  them  medals.  In 
February 1907, the distributor of Russian bribes received the Légion d’Honneur. Some time ago a press 
corruptor offered game for lunch to his friends in a chateau. He had the most distinguished guests. On the 
table were Mr the Minister of Finance, Mr. the Governor of the Bank of France, Mr the Governor of the 
Crédit Foncier, administrators of credit institutions, etc. In summary, the highest names from the financial 
                                                            
45 Lajeune-Vilar, Les coulisses, pp. 54ff; Marinitsch, La bourse, pp. 292–96. 
46 A detailed and well-informed report is available in the French National Archives in Paris (F/7/12842; file Société Générale 
des Annonces, report dated 30 May 1914). 
47 Lajeune-Vilar, Les coulisses; D’Avenel, ―Le mécanisme‖, p. 642. An interesting discussion of the problems associated 
with writing formal contracts emerges in a letter from the Agence Havas (France’s leading provider of primary information) 
negotiator in Budapest and Henri Houssaye, the group’s director in Paris: ―You probably remember that in the first letter you 
sent me on this Hungarian business, you insist on the necessity, in case of the talks succeeds, to sign a written contract. After 
having thought about that, I did not hide that such an arrangement, in its written form, could have serious drawbacks for the 
Hungarian government. Indeed an indiscretion can always happen, and in that case this government will risk to see numerous 
European newspapers asking for a similar settlement and he would bear the risk, in case of it refusing them, to notice the 
build up in those newspapers of a stream of opinions damaging for the Hungarian interests. I told those thoughts to people in 
Bupadest and they agreed with me … and that it would be preferable to be stuck with the current practice. ‖ (Archives Havas, 
5AR/428). 
48 Lajeune-Vilar, Les coulisses, pp. 59–62. See Ellschot, Lijmen, for a novel describing this mechanism in 1920s Flanders. 
49 Lefébure, Havas. 
50 Raffalovich, L’abominable v￩nalit￩, Ageron, ―La vénalité de la presse française‖. 
   12 
who‘s who came to his invitation.
51 
 
D. Data: The Demography of Financial Journals 
Figure 1 tracks the evolution of economic and financial journals in Paris and London – the main financial 
centers of France and England respectively – between 1874 and 1913. Our source for France is the Catalogue 
des Journaux Imprimés for the early years and the Annuaire de la presse for all the subsequent years (a yearbook 
described in greater detail in Section III). These sources provide a list of journals organized by specialty, and we 
collected the total number of journals listed under  finance and économie politique (political economy).  For 
England, we use the Tercentenary handlist of English & Welsh newspapers, magazines & reviews which gives a 
census of all the periodicals published each year in London between 1620 and 1920.
52  
Two facts are evident from Figure 1. First, between 1870 and 1880 (i.e., when markets anticipated that libel 
standards were to be reduced), there was a dra matic increase in the number of French financial journals (from 
about 50 to about 200). In contrast, the number of similar journals in London rose much more gradually. Second, 
absolute numbers for Paris seem astonishingly high  – around 1900 they were more than threefold comparable 
numbers for the London (which are found around 50-80). We can think of but two possible explanations. One is 
that the Parisians were passionate readers of financial news; the other is that not all of the 310 journals that 
existed in 1913 were bona fide publications. Anecdotal evidence suggests this latter explanation has merit. In the 
Paris list, many journals had pseudo-addresses, existed only episodically, and/or cannot be found in any library 
on earth.
53 Many of those we found fr om exploring the records of the  Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris lacked 
continuity—not because the library saved only some copies but rather because the journals‘ sense of ―periodical‖ 
was a creative one (and this is just for those journals that librarians kept in their collections).
54 IN this paper, we 
shall interpret this difference, which is consistent with discussions of the widespread problem of badmouthing in 
France, as resulting from differences in libel law. With weak libel law, there was a greater be nefit in France to 
engage in badmouthing rackets, and this may explain that country‘s large number of journals. 
Figure 1 about here 
We conclude this section by introducing one last stylized fact. In Figure 1, three peaks are discernible in the 
French series.
55 The first coincides with the speculation and crisis of 1881, which ended up with the  Union 
                                                            
51 Lysis, Les coulisses, pp. 162–63. 
52 As for London, the source we use did not classified journals along specialty. We then do this classification ourselves. 
Moreover the source only listed which journals appeared each year. To obtain the number of financial periodicals published 
each year, we then constructed a database in which for each journal that appeared during the period 1844–1914, we created 
an entry of 1 or 0 depending on whether the journal was (or was not, respectively) in operation during that year. The sum for 
each year then gives the number plots on figure 1.  
53 Among the addresses that journal directors gave to the makers of the Annuaire, we find private jokes such as the reference 
by the weekly Finance-revue to the Cour des miracles—the leprosy-ravaged place where thugs enjoyed immunity from the 
Paris police during the Middle Ages—a way of saying: ―I am a swindler but try to catch me!‖ (Mermet, Annuaire, p. 52). 
54 For instance, a ―weekly‖ journal might not be published every week, and number 12 could appear several months after 
number 11. The journal Moniteur des intérêts matériels francais appeared only twice during the first half of 1909, on 15 and 
22 March. The next issue is dated 10 February 1910. The weekly Le message du rentier put out 16 issues during the same 
period, thus failing to publish 10 issues. The weekly La semaine économique et financière was similarly published only 12 
out of a possible 26 weeks, and its numbering is doubtful: issue number 11 appeared on 15 March but the next issue, 
published on 19 April, was numbered 16. The newspaper La fortune internationale had seven issues published during the 
first half of 1909 on (roughly) evenly spaced dates (6 January, 3 March, 11 March, 17 April, 10 May, 28 May, and 14 June). 
The last two newspapers were identified as financial newspapers by the Annuaire de la presse (1909). Details on timing of 
the issues were gathered from the collections of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France. 
55 See Bouvier,  Le krach, for a history of the 1881 bubble. For the second peak, see Bouvier,  Deux scandales; Simon, 
Panama Affair See de Folleville, Rapport, for the affair linked to the third peak.   13 
Générale crash and the so-called Bontoux affair, a political and financial scandal.
56 The second peak (1892–
1893) coincided with the Panama Canal scandal, which took place in an era of heavy speculation in the Paris 
stock market. The scandal erupted when an anti-Semitic and xenophobic newspaper published a list of about 500 
MPs who had received bribes.
57 The last peak (which overlapped with the Russian episode) was  in 1905–1907, 
another period of intense stock market activity. All three episodes thus coincided with IPO booms—in other 
words, the number of journals increased during peaks in financial activity. To construct this as a stylized fact, we 
combine our aggregate number of journals with data for IPOs in the Paris Stock Exchange.
58 We then plot one 
factor against the other (Figure 2) and find a large and significant correlation that is all the more intriguing 
because badmouthing seems not to have entirely quashed  financial development. Instead, Paris was able to 
compete against London. The reason, as we shall see, is that a market setup emerged to cope with badmouthing. 
Figure 2 about here 
Section II. Badmouthing in Theory 
The previous section has identified several important stylized facts. We now construct a theoretical argument 
to account for these critical features of the economics of denigration. In so doing, we also derive predictions 
regarding market structure, intermediaries, amounts appropriated, and the role of politicians. Our theoretical 
inspiration is eclectic, as we draw on insights from finance economics, procurement theory, and option theory. 
The starting argument relates to the literature on intermediaries‘ veracity and reputation liability. In a classic 
paper  by  Chemmanur  and  Fulghieri,  concerns  over  reputation  provide  incentives  for  truthful  revelation.
59 
Another connection is with the literature on the role of external audits  in defusing the reputation risk of issuers 
and underwriters.
60 A common thread of these literatures is that, because a sustained reputation helps protect 
market share over time (and so confers a degree of monopoly power), brand owners are prepared to be honest. 
Any intermediary with a large market share and a long time horizon w ill lose if it tries to extract short -term 
gains.
61 The literature has extensive applications to the role of quality certification in initial public offerings.
62 
This is not surprising when one recalls that IPOs are characterized by a high degree of informat ion asymmetry, 
which makes certification more valuable.  
The dynamic described here explains the connection we made between journal demographics and IPOs, and 
accordingly we apply these insights to badmouthing rackets by journals. Threats of badmouthing pr ovide short-
term gains (to a successful racket). To be credible, the threats must be carried out if the prey does not surrender; 
yet this creates an opportunity for readers to observe that the journal is not reliable: credibility with readers will 
be lost  if and when the target turns out to be successful. Hence the short -tem benefits from rackets must be 
balanced against the long-run costs of brand damage. In sum: reputation plays a disciplinary role in monitoring 
negative coverage, as journals with a reputation will not engage in overt badmouthing (saying bad things about 
good concerns). 
We therefore predict that two types of journals should arise. On the one hand, there should be an army of 
zombie journals. Each has no credibility and thus no concern about retaining it, which makes them extreme and 
                                                            
56 Bouvier, Le krach; Kindleberger, Manias, pp. 114–15. 
57 Simon, Panama Affair; Bouvier, Deux scandales. 
58 This from Saul, ―Banking Alliances.‖ 
59 Chemmanur and Fulghieri, ―Bank Reputation.‖ 
60 Hillison and Pacini, ―Auditor Reputation‖; Lenz and Ostrowski, ―Auditor Choice.‖ 
61 Diamond, ―Reputation acquisition‖; Gorton, ―Reputation formation‖. 
62  Beatty  and  Ritter,  ―Investment  Banking‖;  Allen  and  Faulhaber,  ―Signalling  by  Underpricing‖;  Michaely  and  Shaw, 
―Princing of IPOs‖; Carter, Dark, and Singh, ―Underwriter Reputation.‖; Albano and Lizzeri, ―Strategic Certification‖.   14 
voracious. But then they have no market share, either, and thus no real ability to destroy value. Owning a zombie 
journal is like owning a claim on certain states of the world in which rackets are successful. In equilibrium, if the 
cost of setting up a zombie journal is low (as was the case), then there should be lots of them. The condition for 
this scenario is that the wage opportunity cost of the time spent racketeering must not exceed the expected gain 
should the racket prove successful. 
One way to view these journals is through the lens of option theory. By reducing the cost of entry and 
deterring libel suits, France in 1881 created a system  that encouraged journals to pop up: the value of the 
badmouthing option was less. Relevant parallels may be made with defaulted bonds (whose values do not fall to 
zero because there is some chance the defaulter will eventually pay) and with models of urban migration (where 
agents leave the countryside, and add to urban unemployment, because of the relatively high wages possible if 
they are lucky enough to find a job).
63 Reference to option theory also helps explain why increased activity in the 
stock market was mirrored by an increase in the number of journals (Figure 2). Sinc e there was free entry to the 
badmouthing racket and if there were no economies of scale in organizing a racket it follows that increases in the 
number of potential targets should lead to more fly-by-night journals entering in the Annuaire and not to existing 
ones doing more work.
64 
What we argue therefore is that the French regime fed the existence of a ―reserve army‖ of fly-by-night 
journals that were put into circulation by their director as part of special racketeering operations and then put to 
rest afterward—before being resurrected by the same director (or a friend) under the same guise or in a slightly 
different reincarnation (same address but modified name or vice versa). Given this dynamic, we suggest calling 
such newspapers ―zombie‖ journals—a tribute to their deceased yet aggressive nature. With no pun intended, 
they  only  existed  ―on  paper‖!  We  argue  that  zombie  journals  made  up  the  file  and  rank  of  predatory 
badmouthing. 
We can use the previous insights to estimate the number of zombie journals. Libel law was weak in France 
because of the policy (begun in the 1870s and sustained thereafter) to maximize free entry and prevent anyone 
from controlling freedom of speech. The result was a tight check on Type I errors (true information not being 
revealed) and an increase of Type II errors (there were damaging fabricated rumors). One benchmark estimate of 
the equilibrium number of journals that would have existed under a counterfactual scenario of tighter libel law in 
France may be provided by a comparison between Paris and London. It is unclear how many journals in finance 
and economics are needed by a given economy, but the 50 to 80 journals in London hardly stifled Britain‘s 
economic development.
65 This means that the difference between the Paris and the  London numbers in Figure 1 
provides a lower estimate of the number of journals that existed solely as instruments of rackets and/or to collect 
bribes. In 1900, there were roughly 250 of these. This is a large number. 
Besides the zombies, were journals that care more about reputation—the reliables. There were much fewer of 
these, since they (unlike zombies) had positive market shares. This made the journals most able to circulate 
rumors (because they owned a readership and had credibility) yet also the least inclined (for the same reasons) to 
engage in racketeering. If they circulated views that could later be exposed as wrongful, the journals‘ own 
                                                            
63  See  Hickman,  Corporate  Bond  Quality,  for  defaulted  bonds;  see  Harris  and  Todaro,  ―Migration,‖  for  rural–urban 
migration. 
64 Lajeune-Vilar (Les coulisses, p. 53) gives precisely this (the decline of entry costs and the increase in financial optimism) 
as the reason for the association between the dynamics of the 1881 crisis and the boom in journals creation. 
65 It is obvious from historical evidence that at least some British journals did not have perfect business ethics  (see Trollope, 
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reputations would be destroyed.
66 This would be harmful to the reliables because it would deprive them of the 
revenue from their large pool of readers, which would shrink if journal reputations were compromised. 
The interactions described so far should have implications for the relation between reliability and market 
share, and if circulation figures were known then  a natural test could be made. However, a major limitation of 
contemporary sources is that circulation was not documented properly. This imprecision was part of the period‘s 
more general laissez-faire, and it was not until the 1930s that some (half-hearted) attempts at publicizing figures 
were  made.
67  In particular, no reliable circulation figures existed for commerce and finance journals. We 
therefore focus instead on another theoretical implication of our model. Namely, we study the relation between a 
journal‘s longevity (time horizon) and its ability to charge readers. The reliables have a longer life because they 
made investments in trustworthiness. Conversely, that they have a longer horizon encourages them to make such 
investments. Reliables are more expensive not only because they are more costly to produce but even more so 
because their high quality enables them to charge readers more. We recognize here the familiar arguments, from 
finance  and  signalling  theory,  about  rents  accruing  to  reputation  and  providing  incentives  for  truthful 
behaviour.
68 Zombies, in contrast, have short horizon. Their point is not to invest in reputation; they seek merely 
to take advantage of a target‘s readiness to pay in order to avoid badmouthing.
69 As a result, they cannot really 
charge readers. Their main threat to targets is not that damaging views would reach their loyal readers (since 
they  had none) but rather that the newsboys  would cry down some security. Such a journal is prepared to 
subsidize readers because it needs to influence enough of them that its prey fears possible damage. For all these 
reasons, we expect to observe a positive association between journals‘ longevity and price. 
Our analysis has relevance also for journals‘ governance structures. The very reputation of a reliable journal 
creates an opportunity for hostile takeover by a rogue publisher seeking to profit from badmouthing scandals 
(asset stripping), who could take over a journal with a reputation and use it for racketeering purposes. As the 
process wears on and as some firms refuse to ―cough up‖, the journal would be forced to print some damaging 
reports and eventually the credibility of the journal  would be lost. Other stakeholders (journalists,  minority 
shareholders, readers who paid for unreliable news) would bear the costs.
70 A reliable‘s own journalists likewise 
have an incentive to exploit the journal‘s credibility by attempting to racketeer firms. In particular, we speculate 
that the monitoring of journalists (as by the independent cross-checking of sources) and/or the forms of journal 
ownership (e.g., private versus joint stock ownership) could be studied as possible responses to this problem. 
Lajeune-Vilar  suggests that journalists in bad journals  were paid less and  that this encouraged them  to try 
racketeering  firms  and  politicians.
71  Our analysis suggests an alternative interpretation :  journalists in good 
journals were paid excess wages so as to increase the cost of being fired.  Examining this prediction could yield 
valuable insights, but the lack of much information beyond the anecdotal prevents us from further exploration; 
                                                            
66 This hypothesis has been questioned in behaviorist experiments, but economic historians have ascertained that mistrust in 
one’s newspaper may lead to systematic patterns of voting against that newspaper’s recommendations (Bloch, L’Etrange 
défaite, p. 163). 
67 It must also have supported the operation of the fly -by-night press. An open question is why the reliables did not band 
together to discipline the market by revealing circulation to readers. 
68 A classic reference in this vein is Spence, Job Market Signaling. 
69 Details are provided in Lajeune-Vilar, Les coulisses, pp. 41–46, 58. 
70 See Lajeune-Vilar (Les coulisses, pp. 115–49) on Portalis, a swindler who mounted a hostile raid on Le XIXè siècle, a 
reputable journal that he left essentially bankrupt. Portalis would later be involved in rackets related to the Panama scandal. 
See the New York Times articles entitled ―The Rise and Fall of a Brilliant Newspaper’s Man in Paris‖ (2 January 1895, p. 7) 
and ―Paris Blackmailers Punished; Portalis severest sentence—Canivet and Trocard acquitted‖ (22 February 1895, p. 5). 
71 Lajeune-Vilar, Les coulisses.   16 
we thus leave the matter to future research.
72 
Another important and testable implication of our analysis is a logical extension of the fact that good journals 
are a reputable source of information. Press coverage by a reputable journal can be viewed as a ―certification‖ 
service for which issuers may be prepared to pay. To gain a journal‘s attention, the firm may be willing to buy 
advertising  space.  As  we  shall  see,  there‘s  a  thin  line  between  this  approach  and  the  rating  agency  racket 
described previously. A natural way to think about it therefore is to recognize that reputation is a scarce resource, 
which implies that the ability to charge readers and the ability to charge issuers are complements. This view 
echoes findings from the literature devoted to the study of so-called two-sided markets. The theory of such 
markets explores situations in which ―platforms‖ court two (or more) parties that use the platform to interact 
with each other. For instance, the journal (the platform) reports financial information on firms (one party), and 
investors (the other party) use that information to make investment decisions. The platform (or intermediary) 
must  decide  how  much  to  charge  each  user  type  while  ensuring  that  both  types  will  participate,  since  the 
platform‘s  charges  affect  the  parties‘  willingness  to  interact  and  hence  their  net  surpluses  from  potential 
transactions. Of course, attracting many agents at one end of the market increases the amount a platform can 
charge the other end.
73 In our framework, we predict that good journals can extract more revenues from both 
ends. A reliable journal can charge readers for reliability, and it can attract lots of publicity because it has so 
many readers. We will argue that good news was chasing bad news in the sense that the best insurance against 
badmouthing in bad journals was ―fairmouthing‖ in fair journals—which potential targets secured in return for 
buying publicity. This empirical prediction has strong relevance at a time when the rating agencies‘ model of 
―issuer pays‖ is coming under scrutiny; our analysis suggests that this model is a natural outcome of the market 
mechanism. At a broad level, then, in our model the threat of badmouthing increased revenues for reliables. 
Targets could use ads to make reliables more powerful and create a barrier against zombies—a mechanism that 
also ensured the target firm‘s loyalty to the journal. The argument is that of the efficiency wage theory, whereby 
a firm pays workers above their marginal productivity in order to ensure that they would incur substantial losses 
from shirking.
74 
Our analytical predictions have implications also for the rating agency racket discussed in the Introduction. 
We emphasized that reliables have no incentive to propagate false news. However, they may still  coerce issuers 
into paying for coverage (through publicity) by ―nonmouthing‖ them—in other words, by making no mention of 
them.  This  type  of  racket,  which  contemporaries  described  as  a  ―gentlemanly  racket‖  or  the  racket  of  the 
reliables, raises the theoretical possibility of the capture of issuers by journals  with a reputation. A critical 
requirement for holding the rating agency racket in check is that there be enough competition between good 
journals. 
Given what we have argued so far, the proper way to deal with rackets would be to ignore the zombies and 
buy  advertising  space  in  selected  reliables.  Two  complications  arise,  however.  First,  there  are  information 
asymmetries. The targets had limited knowledge of the exact standing of each journal (after all, there were close 
to  300  economics  and  commerce  journals  in  addition  to  the  political  press),  and  it  was  difficult  for  a 
nonspecialist to tell serious journals from the rest. The target had to know the proper response for each journal—
                                                            
72 Theoretical insights that are closest to the ideas in this paragraph can be found in accounting and management journals. See 
e.g. Eng and Mak, ―Corporate Governance,‖ on governance and disclosure. 
73 Rochet and Tirole, ―Two-Sided Markets.‖ 
74 Shapiro and Stiglitz, ―Equilibrium Unemployment.‖   17 
whether to kick it out or to cough up. There were also some gray areas: the existence of journals that were near 
reliables and others that were near zombies. Both deserved some compensation, however modest, since rumors 
from anywhere could have an effect if they created a spin.
75 Finally, having a hangout (the Académie) helped the 
zombie predators organize campaigns and their prey did not know what was happening at the Académie.
76 
The second complication was the problem of monitoring. The traction of stock options is that they are self -
enforcing. Because revenue from stock options is linked to price performance, stock options in some sense 
committed journalists to deliver. However, results did not relate directly to a single journalist‘s behavior. In other 
words, there was a need for a mechanism that would monitor that both zombies and reliable complied with their 
commitment—i.e. a mechanism to observe that the former has printed the low-value good information that had 
been paid for and that the latter did not forget to report their honest opinion. A few targets could make large 
investments  to  develop  their  own  expertise  and  were  in  the  market  long  enough  to  implement  a  credible 
punishments, but most firms did not have such expertise and longevity. 
In this article we argue that the institutional device through which asymmetry of information and monitoring 
problems were addressed was the ―dealers in financial advertising‖ described in Section I. In the first place, they 
had a detailed knowledge of the market for newspapers and thus knew the ―price‖ of each rumor. Second, their 
employees spent time at the Académie and so were aware of the latest buzz. Third, they were large enough to 
concentrate  on  several  ―accounts‖.  These  features  resolved  the  asymmetry  of  information  and  improved 
compliance. Pooling accounts created economies of scope that permitted brokers to implement credible rewards 
and punishment. Through the agency of brokers, a journal that misbehaved with one target—say, by taking 
money but then printing derogatory information anyway—could be punished when another target came to the 
market. The excluded racketeer could seek revenge, but it would be nothing more than an isolated loser with no 
credibility  of  its  own.  In  other  words,  the  leading  publicity  brokers  were  the  strong-arm  godfathers  of  the 
financial press underworld.
77 
Our conclusion is that the effect of such intermediaries was to contain badmouthing within limits that 
protected the market‘s operation.
78 The prediction we may draw from this conclusion is that the total value 
dissipated by the threat of badmouthing ought to have been limited. Yet before we compute relevant estimates, 
three remarks are in order that suggest the market solution we d epict is fragile. A first problem is the risk of 
monopoly power by the brokers. Brokers have an incentive to provide the prey with a gloomy picture of the 
predator‘s possible effects so as to extract a higher rent as intermediaries. In other words, they can substitute for 
the  racketeers.  Competition  among  publicity  brokers  ought  to  limit  this,  but  we  have  suggested  that  larger 
brokers were more effective. Second, a large part of the money that was being dispensed came (for obvious 
                                                            
75 There are reports suggesting that some rumors, once started, were picked up by other journals. See e.g. Lajeune-Vilar (Les 
coulisses, p. 76): ―In the Paris press, when one or two journals start a campaign all others follow suit the day after.‖ 
76 Cooperation among rumormongers was difficult because of the obvious free -rider problem (i.e., other zombies  would 
benefit from the launch of any campaign), and this protected the issuers to a limited extent. The actual ability of 
rumormongers to coordinate their attacks could not be discounted, but only a specialist could gauge the threat. 
77 The parallel between publicity brokers and economic analyses of the mafia is striking; for a related discussion, see Olson 
and McGuire, ―Economics of Autocracy.‖ 
78 Other benefits of the press broker included the ability for targets to deal with racketeers at arm’s length. Lajeune-Vilar (Les 
coulisses p. 54) suggests that brokers freed the bank from the ―predictable and unavoidable complaints‖ of newspapers, some 
of which had political connections that borrowers did not want to damage. By dealing with a press broker, individual targets 
and banks were able to redirect newspapers’ attempts at extracting revenue toward brokers, thereby saving time for their 
managers.  Another  advantage  of  this  arrangement  is  that  it  centralized  payments,  which  were  generally  made  to  an 
anonymous bank account. Thus the distribution of money was made more transparent for the payer, who could see how much 
had been paid to each journalist.   18 
reasons) from business and finance, so owners of capital wielded considerable influence on the publicity brokers. 
A third concern involves the politicians. The executive appeared at both ends of the game: as purchasers of press 
coverage for domestic loans, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, as publishers of journals (individual 
politicians could run their own zombies and, as politicians, had the power to complicate life for targets). In short, 
there was a huge risk of the certification business being captured by special interests. 
 
Section III. Evidence: How Was Badmouthing Subdued and with What Effects? 
A. Turnover and Quality 
We begin by testing the prediction that better journals were able to charge more. The association between 
quality and price was suggested by contemporary observers. Lajeune-Vilar finds that the ―8 or 9‖ more serious 
journals dealing with commerce, finance, and economics were also the most pricey because they were produced 
by ―well-known and competent economists whose talent is expensive‖.
79 What we want to show is that these 
better journals were also the longest-lived ones. 
To see whether this is true, we constructed longevity data from the Annuaire. This is a painstaking job in 
light of the sheer number of journals and because zombies tended to disappear and reappear. A favorite sport of 
zombie journals was to counterfeit the title of a reliable.
80 For simplicity we limited ourselves to journals listed 
under ―finance‖ (thus leaving aside ―political economy‖) because they constituted the vast majority of financial 
and economic journals. We then proceeded as follows. For each journal that appeared during the period 1890–
1914, we created an entry of 1 or 0 depending on whether the journal was (or was not, respectively) in operation 
during a given year. The result is a total of 770 different journals in operation for at least one year between 1890 
and 1914.
81 
Next, we used the Annuaire to secure price data. This was done by collecting, for each financial journal, the 
price per issue during a given year; this price was then normalized for periodicity.
82 The chosen year was the 
Annuaire volume for 1904.
83 The only reason for picking this volume was its location near the middle of the 
final period when the number of journals was greatest. (Experimenting with other years  gave us confidence that 
results would be robust to a change of benchmark.) In 1904, the Annuaire documented 242 financial journals. A 
large number of these lacked exploitable price information and so were excluded, leaving 118 journals for which 
price is available. In the appendix A.2 we show that journals for which there is no price information were 
ephemeral. That journals without a price were zombies is consistent with our notion that reliable journals should 
have a price that is high and well advertised.
84 
The price data can now be matched with incidence rates (i.e., percentage of years during which a journal 
                                                            
79 Lajeune-Vilar (Les coulisses, p. 51). Le messager de Paris, L’Economiste fran￧ais, and Le capitaliste were mentioned as 
reliables. On cheap unreliable journals, see Moron, Journaux financiers bon marché. 
80 For instance, the title La semaine economique et financière (the zombie mentioned in Section I) bore a ressemblance to La 
semaine financière, a leading reliable. 
81 One should keep in mind that ―existence‖ may not be continuous, so not all journals publish in consecutive years. Our 
estimates also control for journals that started up later in the period and thus could not possibly have been in business during 
all years (see appendix A.2. for details). 
82 As most newspapers were weekly, the benchmark periodicity we used is weekly. See appendix A.2 for details.  We chose 
price per issue because subscription packages were not comparable across journals 
83 Avenel, Annuaire.  
84 One complication is that some zombies seem to have figured out that price was interpreted as an indicator of quality; hence 
they were occasionally sold at a fairly high price that was unjustified in view of their meager content. Our exploration of t he 
data suggests that this practice became more prevalent over time. It was remarked upon by contemporaries such as Soreph 
(Défends ton argent, pp. 54–55).   19 
published). This rate is computed as the probability that a journal is in operation in any given year during the 
period 1892 to 1914. Journals were then sorted into incidence categories (those appearing in 20 percent of the 
period, those appearing during 20–40 percent of the period, and so on). The results are plotted in Figure 3, which 
exhibits the predicted positive association between longevity and price. That is, short-lived journals (those in 
operation during less than 20 percent of the period) sold, on average, for about 0.10 French francs each; whereas 
long-lived journals (those in operation during 80–100 percent of the period) sold for an average price that was 
three times as high. This evidence supports the view that a journal‘s time horizon was strongly related to its 
pricing. 
Figure 3 about here 
B. Two-Sided Markets: Rating Agency Rackets Viewed as Insurance 
We now move one step further and show that reliables were able to charge both readers and issuers through 
advertising. Obviously, journals of higher reputation are more attractive outlets and thus should attract greater 
publicity revenues. We interpret this as meaning that reliables could charge issuers for coverage, and we relate 
this result to the so-called rating agency racket (the allegation that rating agencies coerce issuers into paying for 
the privilege of being rated). Empirically, the hypothesis we want to test is whether there is a positive correlation 
between price (an indicator of quality) and advertising revenues. 
Estimating advertising revenues is not easy, because journals did not generally publish accounts and have left 
no archives. For this purpose, we selected eight financial weeklies of varying quality to serve as a representative 
sample.
85 Next we picked one year (1909) with an eye toward accessibility of the journals in libraries, our source 
for information on price (per issue) and advertising schedules.
86 With the help of a ruler, we then constructed an 
estimate of annual advertising revenues by multiplying the column space of advertising by the rate charged for 
that space.
87 The outcome is displayed in Figure 4, which documents the partial correlation between journals‘ 
price and their advertising revenues. The result suggests that reliables attracted more advertising revenues. We 
see  that  L’Economiste  français,  France‘s  renowned  finance  and  economics  weekly  that  was  modeled  after 
London‘s  The  Economist,  was  the  French  financial  journal  that  sold  at  the  highest  price  (a  price  that 
approximated, at existing exchange rates, the price of The Economist) and was also the one that collected the 
most advertising revenues.
88 
Figure 4 about here 
An inference consistent with these remarks is that the mere threat of badmouthing generated returns to a 
journal‘s reputation. The threat led potential targets to support the high-quality press: it made sense to advertise 
in good journals not only because they were credible but also because doing so encouraged the journals to 
behave  properly.  Anecdotal  evidence  in  line  with  this  interpretation  may  be  found  in  the  Raffalovich 
correspondence.  The  Russian  agent  argued  that  payments  to  zombies  had  to  be  fiercely  contained,  and  he 
                                                            
85 Six journals belonged to the Annuaire’s ―finance‖ category, and the other two (Economiste français and Economiste 
européen) were listed under ―￩conomie politique‖. 
86 One limitation of this approach is that it may overestimate true revenues (since discounts could be granted to large 
purchasers of ads). However, we suspect that this problem is limited. 
87 The enormous cost of proceeding in this manner accounts for our limiting the exploration to a few journals in a single year. 
That being said, inspection of other years and journals gave the impression that relative amounts of advertising were stable 
over time, in which case focusing on one year only is a legitimate way to capture relative rankings. 
88 Evidence suggests that the journal was also profitable. L’Economiste fran￧ais was listed on the OTC market, and data from 
Cote D￩foss￩s (―Cours authentique et officiel de la Bourse de Paris‖—the stock exchange and curb market list) show that it 
distributed dividends averaging 200,000 francs annually in the late 1900s (e.g., 180,000 in 1909, 200,000 in 1910, 180,000 in 
1911, and 280,000 in 1912). The dividend over capitalization ratio fluctuated between 12 et 20 percent during the period.    20 
favored  regular  paid  advertising  in  what  he  thought  were  the  reliable  journals.  Checking  Raffalovich‘s  list 
against  Figure  5  we  can  see  that  he  preferred  the  most  expensive  ones.
89  This result can be  viewed  as a 
rationalization of the ―issuer pays‖ model that currently prevails in the rating industry. In particular, it may be 
efficient (from the target‘s point of view) to help promote a high-quality press because the high quality acts as a 
barrier against the rackets of low-quality journals. Of course, a condition for producing the desired outcome is 
that the certification business be contestable. As long as the reliables behave competitively, none of them can 
expect to extract super-profits. 
Figure 5 about here 
C. Publicity Brokers: Concentration and Value Appropriated 
i. Market Setup 
We have suggested that the institutional device through which racketeers were controlled was the delegation 
of monitoring to a large broker who acted as supervisor of the entire population of racketeers. Here we provide 
descriptive and statistical evidence that is relevant to this claim. We argued that large agents would be needed to 
provide a credible system of intertemporal rewards and punishments: each individual target delegated to its bank 
the supervision of the distribution of monies to the press, and the banks delegated to a small number of publicity 
brokers the task of dealing with requests.
90 Evidence of concentration in the market for advertising brokerage is 
consistent with our analysis. No quantitative study can be made of the brokers, sinc e they left no material, but 
qualitative evidence for the 1890s in secondhand accounts is supportive.
91 Marinitsch and Lajeune-Vilar argue 
that, in the early 1890s, three ―bosses‖ (Laffont, Batiau & Privat, and Lenoir) controlled most of the market.
92 
Twenty years later, Lysis makes the same claim about three principal brokers cornering the market, adding that 
the market was ―very centralized‖.
93 There is also much anecdotal evidence suggesting that market structures 
were  stable  over  time.
94  For  instance,  Lajeu ne-Vilar  reports  that  Lenoir  was  the  agent  for  the  French 
government.
95 Ten years later, the Raffalovich briefs show an official from the Ministry of Finance suggesting 
that the Russians should use the same Lenoir, whom they describe as ―their‖ agent.
96 
The similarly stable relationship between brokers and banks created a risk of capture. The risk was partly 
limited because brokers were asked to provide the list of accounts that had received money; this prevented 
brokers from retaining valuable information and enabled targets to switch more easily to a new broker.
97 On the 
                                                            
89  Because  Russian  propaganda  was published  in  daily,  ―general  interest‖  periodicals,  we  can  perform  another,  similar 
exercise.  Comparing  Raffalovich’s  list  for  these  journals  with  estimates  from  Albert  (―La  presse  fran￧aise‖)  for  the 
circulation  of  general-interest  journals  in  1910,  we  find  that  Russians  preferred  to  use  those  journals  with  the  widest 
circulation. 
90 Of course, this was not the only benefit; another was the ability of targets to deal with racketeers at arm’s length (see note 
80). 
91  Marinitsch,  La  bourse,  pp.  292–96;  Lajeune-Vilar,  Les  coulisses,  pp.  54ff;  Lysis,  Contre  l’oligarchie,  pp.  162–63. 
Contemporary accounts suggest that who dealt with whom (what broker with what bank) was common knowledge which 
indicates that these accounts are reliable—especially since they are so consistent with one another.. According to Lajeune-
Vilar  (Les  coulisses,  pp.  54ff),  the  House  of  Rothschild  (an  investment  bank)  and  Comptoir  d’escompte  (a  leading 
commercial bank) were in business with Laffont. Cr￩dit Lyonnais and the Cr￩dit Foncier (France’s biggest commercial bank 
and main mortgage bank, respectively, the latter involved in the Panama scandal) used Batiau, and Lenoir serviced the 
French government. 
92 Marinitsch, La bourse; Lajeune-Vilar, Les coulisses. 
93 Lysis, Short Title, pp. 168–69: ―Au point de vue financier, deux ou trois personnes […] monopolisent [la corruption de la 
presse].‖ 
94 In the 1900s, Favre (Banques et banquiers, p. 82) gave a list of the press advertising agencies that includes both more 
―regular‖ agencies and the genuine brokers described here. 
95 Lajeune-Vilar, Les coulisses, pp. 54ff. 
96 Raffalovich, L’abominable v￩nalit￩, p. 90 
97 All the contact details of dealers in financial advertising were published in various yearly books such as Favre, Short Title,   21 
other hand, because rumors and gossip changed over time, brokers retained an edge and so, if they had served 
the  client  well,  would  naturally  maintain  that  relation.  We  also  have  evidence  that  payment  schemes  were 
tailored to minimize moral hazard. For instance, Lysis reports that brokers were paid a lump-sum fee and thus 
lost money if payments to journals overran.
98 
A corollary prediction of our model is that the largest borrowers on the market were also those with the most 
incentive to develop their own monitoring schemes, since they could more easily internalize the needed expertise 
and could also inflict intertemporal penalties themselves (they accessed the market repeatedly and thus had a 
―memory‖). Once again, the Russian case provides an illustration.  As a  frequent borrower in Paris, Russia 
developed an expertise in the Paris press by appointing special agents from the 1890s onward.
99 Much like the 
publicity brokers, these agents were knowledgeable about the press milieu (because they had been around for so 
long) and were able to monitor journalists through rewards and punishments (because Russia was such a large 
borrower).
100 For instance, at  some stage we find Russians making payment to a jo urnal conditional upon the 
nonpublication of damaging information. As Raffalovich explains: ―It must be understood that it will last ‗during 
good behavior‘ because if they cheat too openly on us, the Minister can always become angry.‖
101 Although 
eventually Russia dealt partly through the press broker Lenoir, they came to this decision late, and very partially. 
ii. How Much Was Appropriated? 
Here we provide estimates of the amounts paid to the press. We have emphasized the relation between IPO 
and rackets, so it seems natural to measure the ―overall‖ revenues that the press (good or bad) derived from 
IPOs. Recall that, consistently with what we argued earlier, payments were made in normal times (each year) 
and also when borrowers felt vulnerable (whenever an IPO occurred). Good journals, in particular, received 
regular payments in the form of advertising or publicity, encouraging them to provide proper coverage in times 
of stress as already discussed. For the case of Russia, Figure 6 graphs total payments to the press and highlights 
the decomposition into regular payments (―publicity‖) and exceptional payments (―bribes‖). The figure shows 
that racket payments were more volatile than publicity payments, vindicating our interpretation of the latter as an 
insurance  premium.  We  can  see  that  racket  money  peaked  between  1904  and  1906—that  is,  between  the 
outbreak of the war with Japan and the eventual consolidation of Russian finances through a 1906 security issue. 
In other words, issuers divested themselves of resources in normal times—most probably to reliable outlets—but 
during periods of stress had to increase divestments through the agency of publicity brokers, who distributed 
funds to reliable and zombie journals both. Focusing on IPOs and estimating the amounts paid to the press is 
therefore a natural way to assess the total damage from badmouthing and to show that, as we surmise, this 
damage was limited thanks to the existence of some institutional solutions. 
Figure 6 about here 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
or the Annuaire de la presse during the 1890s. 
98 Lysis, Contre l’oligarchie, pp. 162–63. 
99 Raffalovich, L’abominable v￩nalit￩. 
100 Raffalovich was possibly their best asset, since he was a Paris-based economist and published a noted financial market 
yearbook. Raffalovich also belonged to the distinguished  Soci￩t￩ d’Economie Politique, and he was acquainted with and 
respected  by  all  relevant  economists  of  the  time.  Raffalovich  was  a  personal  friend  of  Leroy-Beaulieu,  editor  of 
L’Economiste fran￧ais; he also contributed to the main dictionaries of political economy and gave lectures and conferences in 
prestigious Paris institutions. Raffalovich established himself as a leading authority with the publication of a thick (close to 
1,000 pages) annual macroeconomic outlook, Le marché financier, that was produced with a team of economists. Le marché 
financier rapidly became a reference that was avidly read by the public specializing in finance, both in France and abroad. 
The Economist regularly highlighted the publication of Raffalovich’s macroeconomic annual (e.g., The Economist, 18 June 
1898, p. 911). 
101 Raffalovich, L’abominable v￩nalit￩, p. 187.   22 
The underwriting contracts found in bank archives typically contain mentions of payments ―made to the 
press‖. The numbers are never reported transparently, however, and it is possible that they mask additional 
opaque transfers made from the underwriter‘s (or some other) budget. Our methodology is to identify market 
access  events  for  which  we  can  match  an  independent  source  on  payments  to  the  press  with  data  from 
underwriting contracts, thereby deriving a reasonably reliable estimate. Such an opportunity is provided by the 
disclosure/divulgence of press payments made public in 1909 by a reportedly upset director general of Banque 
de Paris et des Pays-Bas (contemporaries suggested there were motives beyond a sudden bout of honesty).
102 As 
a result, we have evidence for three issues that can be m atched against information in underwriting contracts 
found in bank archives; this makes a high-quality test possible. 
Table 1 about here 
The  three  loans  are  a  1899  Hungarian  Mortgage  Bank  bond  (Obligations  Communales  3.5%  du  Crédit 
Foncier de Hongrie), a 1902 Bulgarian 5 percent loan, and a 1905 Brazilian (Sao Paulo) 5 percent loan. For 
these, we have worked with sources to document the total payments made to the press on the occasion of the IPO 
against two relevant benchmarks: (i) the total amount appropriated by issuers and (ii) the share appropriated by 
banks  through  underwriting  fees.  These  are  natural  benchmarks  because  bankers  provided  originating, 
marketing, distributing, and insurance services and also provided signaling and certification, thus competing 
with the press along some dimensions.
103 
We also document a 1906 Russian  5 percent loan that concluded the protracted period of  ―Russia bashing‖ 
that started with the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1906). In this case, the distribution of monies was not in direct 
relation to the loan itself because the campaign began before the loan was in sight; however, war almost always 
led  to  borrowing  and  Russian  authorities  coughed  up  because  they  wanted  to  keep  their  options  open.  As 
indicated by Figure 6, ―bribes‖ were largely discontinued as soon as the war was over and the loan issued (in the 
spring of 1906). One reason for adding this loan to Table 1 is that Russia—unlike the other borrowers listed 
there— attempted to internalize to a higher degree  the  monitoring of  zombies,  and it is informative to see 
whether this resulted in higher or lower levels of spending. 
Based on the sources mentioned previously, Table 1 documents the value appropriated by journals. Three 
features stand out. First, as a share of the capital actually borrowed, the amounts appropriated are relatively 
small: about half of a percentage point.
104 Second, the numbers  remain small even when compared with the 
underwriting fees, of which they represent only a fraction (between 6 and 1 8 percent). This may be taken as 
proof that the problem of  badmouthing was indeed  under control. It also suggests that the bulk of the value 
resulting from certification services was appropriated by banks, not by the media.
105 This result is consistent with 
our finding that lar ge banks disciplined  badmouthing  by  aggregating  customers and organizing  centralized 
retaliation via the publicity brokers described  here. One implication is that these publicity brokers were, to a 
large extent, delegated monitors of the underwriting banks. In fact, badmouthing was eating into banks‘ margins 
                                                            
102 Le globe published the numbers of the Hungarian loan in its issue of 25 November 1909 (pp. 908–909). The Bulgarian 
numbers appear in the same periodical a week later (on 2 December 1909, pp. 930–31) and the Sao Paulo loan numbers 
appeared in the issue dated 9 December 1909 (pp. 948–50). For comment and a discussion of the reasons for the leak, see 
L'écho des capitalistes of 9 December 1909. L’￩cho reported that Albert Turrettini, the new director general of the bank 
declared ―La presse, je m’en f…!‖ (in English, ―F… the press!‖). Other leaks followed until eventually interrupted. 
103 For details of underwriting fees paid to French banks during the period, see Flandreau et al., ―The End of Gatekeeping‖. 
Their study implies that fees in Britain and France were roughly competitive. 
104 See Table 1 in Flandreau et al., ―The End of Gatekeeping.‖ 
105 Note that appropriations by the press were relatively large compared with modern underwriting fees for similar securities, 
which averaged 0.54% for issues in New York from 1993 to 2007; see Flandreau et al., ―The End of Gatekeeping.‖   23 
and so controlling it was a necessary condition for the banks to compete internationally, at which they were quite 
successful. The numbers for Russia are also interesting. We see that, although the campaign was spread out over 
two and a half years, the total spent (as a share of sums eventually borrowed in Paris) is comparable to what we 
find for other deals where monies were paid in relation to one issue only. This fact suggests that Russia‘s 
campaign was cost-effective, which in turn supports our conjecture that bigger agents are better equipped to 
handle racketeers and also explains why Raffalovich strenuously tried to circumvent the publicity brokers. 
Finally, combining our estimates of IPO-related appropriations with IPO data enables us to develop a sense 
of the total amounts appropriated by the press; the Appendix A.4 provides details and a chart. In 1913, these 
amounts rose to about 20 million French francs (from about 10 million FF at the beginning of the 1900s). These 
are large absolute numbers. They amount to more than a leading contemporary bank‘s annual budget for running 
a  research  department  with  about  one  hundred  employees  and  an  economic  research  library.
106  Also, the 
substantial increase explains why the number of zombies rose inexorably: more people each year were prepared 
to pay to keep them underground. 
iii. Value Diversion by Zombies 
We stated that, of the amounts paid to the press during IPOs, some went to zombies (and to the press agents  
who controlled them) and some went to reliables. We conclude this paper by providing estimates of the 
breakdown of bribes according to journal type. We speculate that, since reliables received money through regular 
publicity (akin to insurance), the bulk of the IPO payments went to zombies and associated crooks. 
The evidence comes  from the same three episodes discussed earlier (the Hungarian Mortgage Bank, 
Bulgaria‘s loan, and Sao Paulo). The relevant information leaked by the disgruntled director included a list of 
journals and intermediaries that were paid. We constructed the share appropriated by the press underworld as a 
residual (journals and press brokers).
107 Namely, we subtracted from total amounts paid to the press monies 
distributed to ―reliables‖. Reliables were identified using Raffalovich (1931) list of more serious financial and 
general interest newspapers. In Table 2, they are identified as ―influential financial newspapers‖ and ―influential 
general newspapers‖. The Table then shows that the underworld appropriated between 62% and 70% of totals.
108 
The striking conclusion is that while the reliables did attract resources, their share barely reached 40 percent. 
Leading financial journals received but a tiny portion of the total, a fact that contemporary observers deplored.
109 
Within the reliables, the main recipients of this money were the generalist newspapers. This makes sense 
because their nonspecialized form enabled them both to reach a wide audience and to apply extensive ―soft‖ 
                                                            
106 Flandreau, ―Caveat Emptor.‖ Around 1900, the annual budget of  Cr￩dit Lyonnais’ research department was 1 million FF. 
107 Lenoir was referred to as ―Mr. X‖. There were also some other brokers who acted for several journals at once and were 
referred to as ―R￩gies‖. 
108  As an alternative to the Raffalovich criterion, we also identify leading general -interest dailies by using circulation 
numbers for 1910 (Albert, ―La presse fran￧aise.‖) and selecting dailies with a circulation greater than 50,000. This category 
overlaps only partly with the Raffalovich newspapers. 5 journals (out of 12) had a circulation greater than 50,000 a day and 
were not paid by the Russians. Likewise, we selected the most pricey financial journals (50cts or more).  Figure 5 shows the 
partial overlap between Raffalovich and this criterion. Computations with this alternative definition do not alter the basic 
message with about 60 to 70% of monies appropriated by the underworld. For more details see appendix. 
109 ―Les grands organes financiers, ceux qui engagent les capitalistes à souscrire dans les émissions, ceux dont les conseils 
financiers sont écoutés et suivis par leurs abonnés et lecteurs ne figurent dans ce budget de publicité que pour des chiffres 
infimes, relativement.‖ L’￩cho des capitalistes (9 December 1909, #42, p. 1). Le globe (9 November 1909, p. 858) pointed 
out that ―C’est pourtant avec l’argent de ces actionnaires [les ￩tablissements de credit] qu’on alimente la caisse de nombre de 
feuilles politiques notoirement incapables de faire, au point de vue financier, une publicit￩ utile.‖ Also, Raffalovich, also the 
disburser of Russian monies, was generally perceived as a moral character in a corrupted world : M. Raffalovich was well 
known in both financial and political circles of Paris, where he enjoyed wide personal respect because of the unfailing 
rectitude of his private conduct and official actions during a period when financial scandal was frequent both in French 
finance and in the Franco-Russian relations (p. 12, The New-York Times, 13 January 1922).   24 
badmouthing by ignoring certain issuers. Thus the united zombies and publicity brokers were receiving the lion‘s 
share (more than 60 percent) of the total press expenses during IPOs. The rest was mostly received by the 
general press. Good financial journals, in contrast, were mostly funded by charging their readers and attracting 
regular publicity. 
Table 2 about here 
 
Conclusions 
This article has reviewed some features of the market for financial information in France before World War I. 
We studied how libel law, or a lack thereof, created weak property rights over reputation. We saw that absence 
of strong enforcement procedures encouraged the creation of ―zombie‖ journals, of which there were at least 250 
in the field of finance around 1900. Yet we argued that, in practice, badmouthers did not wield disproportionate 
influence  on  the  market  because  various  arrangements  emerged  to  cope  with  the  situation.  We  found  that 
journals with a reputation had no interest in making damaging allegations—unlike journals without a reputation. 
Coordination of the latter was assisted by bandwagon effects or explicit coordination (the Académie de chant). 
Finally, we found that rumors were more likely to be planted when there was a greater likelihood that others 
would pick it up. Initial public offerings provided the hunting ground. 
We identified two main mechanisms that mitigated the problem of issuers being targeted by badmouthing 
racketeers. 
First, the risk of racket increased the value of more serious journals. Some, such as L’Economiste fran￧ais, 
emerged as standards of reliability. The result was that they were able to attract stable advertising revenues. This 
finding, we argued, may explain why providers of financial information were able to charge the concerns they 
rated—a conclusion that may be relevant now that the relations between issuers and rating agencies are coming 
under attack. 
The second solution that emerged to deal with badmouthing was the corralling of borrowers by their bankers 
(the underwriters) and the pooling of bribes through delegated monitors called ―publicity brokers‖, who were in 
charge of dispensing the ―right‖ amount of bribes. The resulting equilibrium was enforced by brokers in two 
ways.  First,  by  signing  up  a  number  of  (financially  incompetent)  people  for  press  campaigns,  the  brokers 
subsidized  a  ―party‖  supporting  the  issuers  that  had  paid  for  it:  the  badmouthers  were  paid  above  their 
opportunity cost, securing the coordination of information-poor media to not fabricate damaging information. 
Second, because of their concentration, brokers had the means to retaliate against deviating individuals. 
This scenario belonged to the world of second-best solutions. For the ―Belle Epoque‖ as the era leading up to 
WWI is known, we estimated that roughly 15 million francs (of 1913) were paid annually in ―bribes‖, of which 
some 60 percent ended up in the pockets of racketeers. Although this may have been small potatoes compared to 
total issues in Paris or to the benefits that accrued to underwriters, the total sum (of about 150 million FF during 
the 1892-1913 period) is fairly high and is much larger than the profits earned by the reliable journals. In a better 
world, this money—instead of lining the pockets of white-collar thugs, politicians, and venal journalists—could 
have funded a higher-quality press. 
The reasons for this equilibrium’s emergence remain to be understood, just as we need also to work out 
relevant comparisons with other countries beyond the useful parallel developed here with Great Britain. Another 
possible outcome was parking all of the bribe money with the reliable media, thereby raising entry costs for the   25 
racketeers.  On  this  account,  we  note  that  the  leading  London  financial  journal  (The  Economist  and  its 
supplement, the Investors’ Monthly Manual) was thicker—for a comparable price—than L’Economiste fran￧ais. 
We found that L’Economiste fran￧ais charged readers more than did its French competitors and also attracted 
more publicity, but that was not enough to vanquish the zombies. This failure was regretted by borrowers, such 
as the Russian financial agent Raffalovich.
110 
An interesting hypothesis that future research may well wish to explore is that certification by journals (or 
rating  agencies)  competes  against  certification  by  banks.  Recent  research  shows  that  dur ing  this  period, 
underwriting banks collected large revenues from underwriting and certification services.
111 A higher-quality 
press might have reduced the profit margins of banks sponsoring IPOs. Bankers may thus have preferred to bribe 
journals, and—by helping to maintain a critical level of corruption in equilibrium—they depreciated the quality 
of their competitor which amounted to protecting their own certification power -- and corresponding revenues. 
Another (not mutually exclusive) interpretation emphasizes the role of politicians. As already told by earlier 
historians and as mentioned in this article, politicians and parties were generally involved in the most extensive 
briberies. Journals, some of which were controlled by parties, were ideal vehicles for laundering racket money. 
A racket could be used to buy political favors or votes in parliament, and the money paid could be simply 
registered under ―publicity‖. The irony of this conclusion is that a regime based on freedom of speech does not 
guarantee that the truth will out. 
 
Geneva and Paris, 27 August 2010 
 
                                                            
110 Raffalovich, L’abominable v￩nalit￩. 
111 Flandreau et al., ―The End of Gatekeeping‖   26 
Archives 
Bank Archives 
-  Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas Paris 
-  Crédit Lyonnais, Paris 
-  Société Générale, Paris 
Agence Havas, Archives Nationales, Paris 
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Figure 1. Number of Newspapers Specialized in Economics and Finance in France and Britain 
 
Source : Authors‘ computations. French Data on the number of newspapers in France were published in the 
volumes of the yearly Catalogue des Journaux Imprimés (1875, 1877) edited by Gébé, La Publicité en France 
(1878, 1879, 1880) edited by Mermet and the Annuaire de la Presse (1881-1914), edited by Mermet (1881-
1891), Avenel (1892-1904/05) and Bluysen (1907-1914). Each volume appeared at the beginning of the year, 
and then reflected the number of newspapers published in December of the preceding year. English data one the 
appearance of newspapers are taken in the Tercentenary handlist of English & Welsh newspapers, magazines & 
reviews (1920) which give a census of all the periodicals published each year in London between 1620 and 1920.  
 
Figure 2. Number of Financial and Political Economy Journals and IPO Volumes in Paris  














































































Source: Newspapers: Authors. Securities publicly issued in Paris from Saul (2005, p. 122, Stock publicly issued 
in France) citing Chadeau (1989, L‘￩conomie nationale au 19eme si￨cle) and the INSEE statistical yearbook 
(1951, 1961 et 1966). Nominal values were deflated using the index of Levy-Leboyer and Bourguignon (1985).    31 
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Source: Authors‘ computations, from Annuaire de la Presse. See appendix A.2. for details on the computation of 
longevity numbers and prices.  
 
  
Figure 4: Advertising revenues versus price per issue, selected newspapers.  
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Source: Authors’ estimates, from journals. See appendix A.3. for details. 
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Source: Authors, from Raffalovich (1931) and Annuaire 1904-05. 
 
















Source: Authors, from Raffalovich 1931.   33 
Table 1. The Cost of Badmouthing: Value Appropriated by Intermediaries  
  Hungarian 
Mortgage Bank 
3.5% 1899 
Bulgaria 5% 1902  Sao Paulo 5% 1905  Russia 5% 1906 
Date  1899  1902  1905  1904-1906 
Amount raised by Borrower (a) 
Millions FF  18.6  86.4  38.24 (b)  1002.00 (b) 
―Bribes‖ 
Amount (Millions FF) 
 
 
























―Bribes‖ and ―Publicity‖ 

















































Press as % of Bankers‘ fee  14.54  5.8  17.59  11.00 
Sources: Authors‘ computation from Le Globe November 25, 1909 (Hungary), December 2, 1909 (Bulgaria) and BNP 
Paribas archives, folder 11 DFOM 221/424 (Sao Paulo), Raffalovich (1931, Russia), Archive Banque de Paris et des Pays-
Bas, BPPB, 6/DFOM/221 61 (Bulgaria), SuzBritaini (1994), Archive Crédit Lyonnais, Emprunt Russe 5% 1906, Schedule 
N° 29.336.  
Notes 
(a): This is the amount that borrowers actually received. Bankers‘ fees, plus stamp duty (not reported) must be included 
to give price of issue (or price to the public). 
(b): Paris share. 
(c): This is the sum of the amounts paid as bribes according to Raffalovich (1931) between February 1904 and June 1906 
or 3 millions, and the appropriation for publicity in the contract with the Russian government, dated April 16, 1906 or 2 
millions. 
(d): including 0.054688 paid for advertisements in Amsterdam, Bruxelles and Geneva, see appendix A.4. 
(e): The loan was issued by a syndicate lead by Paribas (40%) and the Dresdner Bank and Schaafhaausen’ schen (60%). 
The percentage reported is for the Paribas’ share only. It decreased to 0.49% when the press expenses are compared to the 
total amount of the loan.   
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Table 2: Payments to Reliable Newspapers During Three Loan Issues.  
 
Share distributed to brokers and influential periodicals  










Total influential periodicals (financial and general interest), of which 
 
-  - Influential political or general interest newspapers (a) 
 
o  Among which, those with a circulation greater than 
50,000 a day 
o  Among which, those with a circulation lower than 
50,000 a day 
 



































Total any other journals and publicity brokers (b)  70.64  65.74  62.74 
Total  100  100  100 
Sources : Authors computations from various issues of Le Globe (November 25, December 2 and December 9, 
1909) and Albert, ―La presse Fran￧aise‖ for the circulation numbers. Influential periodicals are those chosen by 
Raffalovich (1931).  
Notes: 
(a) This category included 7 dailies with a circulation greater than 50,000 a day and 5 with a lower circulation 
(among which one find for example Le Figaro and Le Temps) 
(b) The numbers of this category were obtained as the result of the difference between the advertising budget as 
indicated in table 1 and the money received both by the influential newspapers and by those dailies that had a 




   35 
Data appendix. 
A.1. French data on cases of libel and insult in newspapers 
The data on libel cases in newspapers (under different labels during those years among which one find, under the headings 
―Presse‖, ―Diffamations et injures, loi diverses‖ for the period 1866–1881, ―Diffamations et injures (loi du 29 juillet 1881)‖ 
for the period 1886–1906 and  ―Presse (Loi du 29 juillet 1881) : diffamation et injures (Art 32 et 33)‖ in 1911) comes from 
the justice ministry in the Compte de la justice criminelle, a periodical publishing the judicial statistics on the cases judged by 
French courts. Numbers on people accused and convicted of defamation and libel were collected every five years at the 
national level. Figure A.1 draws the evolution of the rate of people convicted per 100,000 inhabitants. Albert (1972, p. 246-7) 
provides lower numbers. He cited during the period 1871 to 1913 724, a tiny figure, compared with the number of journals 
















































rate of convicted per 100,000 inhabitants
 
Figure A.1. Rate per 100,000 inhabitants of people convicted of libel and/or insult in the press and conviction 
rate in France (1866-1911) 
 
A.2. Data on the longevity of financial newspapers (figure 3) 
 
Duration and characteristics of the newspapers in France 
Data on the population of newspapers in activity during a year were collected for 17 years of the 1890-1914 period (1890, 
1892, 1894, 1895, 1896, 1897, 1898, 1899, 1900, 1901, 1904-5, 1907, 1908, 1910, 1911, 1912 and 1914). In the end, 771 
financial newspapers appeared at least once during the sampled years. For 108 newspapers, we were not able to find a 
founding year, in which case we assumed that it was the one of their year of appearance in the Annuaire de la Presse. The 
descriptive statistics on the years of founding and the incidence probability are in the table A.1. It shows that the median of 
the year of founding was 1893while the mean is 1891 It also helps to compare the average maximum duration of newspapers 
with the actual one (third and fourth columns). On average, after having took into account the founding year, a financial 
periodical could have been published during more than twelve years, the average newspapers appeared only during less than 
five years. The difference is stronger when the mode or the median are used. Consequently the incidence probability is only 
39% on average. This shows that a newspaper has only 40% of survival during the next year. The median is lower at 33%.  
 
  Founding year  Maximum numbers of years a 
newspaper could appeared 
Number of years a newspaper 
actually appeared  Incidence probability 
Mean  1891.77  4.88  12.82  0.40 
Median  1893  3  15  0.33 
Mode  1907  1  17  0.058 
St. Dev.   13.19  4.26  4.84  0.29 
Kurstosis  2.19  0.75  -1.26  -0.82 
Skewness  -1.03  1.29  -0.65  0.59 
Minimum  1829  1  1  0.058 
Maximum  1914  17  17  1 
# observations  770  770  770  770 
 
Table A.1. Descriptive statistics on the longevity of newspapers  
Sources: Authors from various issues of the Annuaire.  
Computing longevity of newspapers 
During the 17 sampled years, a newspaper founded before or in 1890 could have appeared in the Annuaire de la Presse 
between 1 and 17 times. The incidence probability is computed as the ratio of the number of years a given journal   36 
appears in the 1890-1913 sample by the number of years of that period. Therefore, if a journal appeared 17 times, 
its probability is equal to one. A correction was made to those newspapers founded after 1890. For any newspaper founded 
after 1890, we adjusted the maximum numbers of years by the potential longevity of this journal. Indeed, a newspaper 
founded before 1890 may appeared during the 17 sampled years while a newspapers founded in 1914 could have appeared at 
most once. We adjusted by using the founding year (or the first year of appearance in the Annuaire in case of missing data). 
Therefore, for any newspaper founded in 1891 or 1892, we computed the same ratio but using 16 as the denominator. For any 
newspapers created in 1893 or 1894, we divided it by 15 and so on. 
Each newspaper is then characterized by a probability that it appeared during the sampled  years. Figure A.2. plots the 
distribution of newspapers‘ longevity by decile. The graph reads as follows. Among the population of 771 newspapers, 
14.5% had a longevity lower than 10% while 7.4% experienced a longevity greater than 90%, which means that they were 























































Figure A.2: Share Distribution by decile of the longevity of newspapers in Paris (1890-1914). 
Source : Authors‘ computation based on various issues of the Annuaire de la presse (Paris). 
 
Connecting the probability to appear with the price per issue. 
We use 1904 as the reference year to compute the relation between the price per issue and the longevity of newspapers.  
The price per issue is adjusted for the varying periodicity of each newspaper. We convert every price into the price of a 
weekly. The price per issue of dailies was then multiplied by 6, the number of working days in a week. The price of those 
appearing two times a month was divided by two. For those appearing two times a week, their prices were multiplied by 2 
(and so one with the newspapers appeared three times a month). Two newspapers have a price well above the others‘ price 
(amounting at 3 and 4 francs per issue, about 11 (15 resp.) times higher than the mean or the modal price). In order not to bias 
the result, we excluded them for the analysis. We added l’Economiste Francais and l’Economiste européen because, although 
the Annuaire de la Presse classified them as political economy newspapers, they were among the most usual references in the 
financial industry. We ended up then with 243 newspapers.  
 
Issue price (adjusted for periodicity)  0 ≤ p < 0.2  0.2 ≤ p < 0.4  0.4 ≤ p < 0.6  ≥  0.6  no price  Total 
# of newspapers  49  51  10  8  125  243 
Table A.2: Distribution of the price of newspapers in 1904, adjusted for periodicity 
Source: Authors from Annuaire de la Presse, 1904-5.  
 
  Adjusted price per issue  Longevity of priced journals  Longevity of non- priced journals 
Mean  0.2367 FF  0.697  0.602 
St. Dev.   0.1943  0.227  0.224 
Median  0.20 FF  0.7058  0.588 
Mode  0.25 FF  1  1 
Kurstosis  4.5606  -0.746  -0.755 
Skewness  1.919  -0.3902  0.0272 
Table A.3: Descriptive statistics of the price of newspapers in France in 1904 
Source: Authors from Annuaire de la Presse, 1904-5. 
 
A Fischer-Snedecor test of the equality of variance between the population of the longevity of newspapers with a price and 
the population of the non-priced indicated that the hypothesis of equality cannot be rejected at a 5% confidence level. The 
variance longevity of both sub-populations did not differ too much. A test of equality of means indicated that the equality of 
the means of both sub-samples can be rejected at a confidence level of 5% (t-stat equal 3.298). The longevity of priced 
newspapers was therefore significantly higher than those of the non-priced.  
 
A.3. Estimating advertising revenues (Figure 4) 
 
The estimate of the revenues derived by newspapers from financial advertising was computed using a measure of the volume 
of advertising and the price of advertising per line. All journals except Ruy Blas only published financial advertising, e.g.. 
announcements of a security issue, reports of shareholders‘ meetings. As we want to measure the ability of each journal to   37 
attract financial advertising, we exclude the revenues from commercial advertising from the estimation for Ruy-Blas.  
Three types of financial advertising may be distinguished at that time.  
  The first type will be now considered as regular advertising, i.e. "conspicuous announcements printed in special 
characters and appearing in a predefined section" (Leroy-Beaulieu, 1906, p. 251). Their appearance in a distinct 
section of the journal made them especially easy for the readers to distinguish from regular editorial content. 
Among the types of advertising published in this section, one can found the serial numbers of bonds drawn at 
the lottery for reimbursement by the issuers, ads for the services proposed by banks or IPO announcements.  
  The second type consisted in the publication, without editorial adds-on, of administrators‘ reports or of the 
decisions and/or minutes of the shareholders meetings. They usually appeared in a separate section.   
  The  third  type  consists  in  what  was  known  as  that  time  as  réclame,  i.e.  laudatory  articles  that  normally 
appeared in the editorial section of the newspaper and were paid for by the companies being lauded. 
While estimating the advertising revenues of newspapers, we choose to exclude the réclame for two reasons. First, by its 
very nature, it is very difficult to distinguish one of them from regular editorial content. Second our aim is to measure the 
ability of  each newspaper to attract advertisements, i.e. advertisements that can be easily distinguished from the edited 
articles  (In  a  context  in  which  it  was  said  that  companies  prefered  réclames).  We  then  included  in  our  estimates 
advertisements of the first and second types. Advertisement was invoiced to companies by charging a price per line. Each 
price of the various types of advertisements was usually printed just below the journal‘s title. The estimate of the revenues 
derived from advertising was constructed by multiplying the number of lines of advertising by their price.  
To construct the number of lines, we proceed as follows. Each advertising section has a given number of columns (for 
most of the sampled newspapers, there exist between 2 and 3 columns). Because the typesetting and the organization of the 
space were standardized, a column always contained a given number of lines. Therefore the measure of the number of lines 
of advertising is the product of the number of columns by the number of lines times the number of pages devoted to 
advertisements. This estimate of a journal‘s advertising revenues was then computed as the product of the price per line 
(published on the front page) by the number of lines. The advertising revenues were estimated using all issues published 
during the 1
st semester of 1909. Table A.4 sums up the main information on each of the sample journal.  
 




















Le Rentier  0.5  Every 10 days  288  84.7  23.05%  85558.48  2.5  85559.48     
L'Économiste Européen  0.5  Weekly  1038  204  14.65%  117623  2.5  4982  4  26292 
L'Économiste Francais  0.9  Weekly  990  194  19.36%  148410  2.5  59364     
L'intermédiaire du capitaliste  0.2  Every 10 days  288  12.43  3.50%  NA  NA       
Le Globe  0.25  Weekly  500  71.78  14.36%  30685.5  1.5  20457     
L'écho des capitalistes  0.25  Weekly  168  37  22.02%  23293  2  9317  3  1553 
Ruy Blas  0.4  Weekly  696  169  24.28%  49708.30  Table A.5.       
La semaine économique et 
financière  0.25  Bimonthly  108  14.26  13.20%  4876.5  1.5  3251     
La bourse pour tous  0.1  Weekly  100  3.92  3.92%  NA  NA       
La semaine financière  0.25  Weekly  680  110  16.18%  56357.82  1.5  37572     
Table A.4 : Advertising space and advertising revenues in a sample of French financial periodicals, 1st semester of 1909.  
Sources: Source: Authors from the journals. Location of the various periodicals: La Semaine économique et financière, Le 
Rentier, L’économiste européen: Private collection. Any of the other newspapers: Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris.  
 
Some remarks are noteworthy on the following newspapers.  
Le  Rentier  announced  a  price  per  line  of  advertising  equal  to  2.5  Francs.  Five  categories  of  advertising  were 
distinguished: (a) Announcements of coupons‘ payment, (b) announcement of the numbers of lottery bonds, (c) minutes and 
convocation of shareholders meetings and of the board of directors, (d) other financial advertising on 5 columns pages and (e) 
other financial advertising on 3-columns pages. The Rentier mentioned a single price per line for any advertising. Therefore 
the estimation of the advertising revenues was made by multiplying for each section the number of lines by the price per line. 
As for any other newspapers, self-promotion (3 pages or 3.5 percent of the advertising space) is not included in the estimates 
of advertising revenues.  
L’économiste  Européen  published  two  types  of  advertisement,  depending  on  the  size  of  the  printed  characters. 
Advertisement with a small character size were invoiced 2.5 Francs per line while those in the bigger size (comparable to the 
size of the editorial content) was invoiced 4 Francs per line. The mean price of advertisement in this journal is 3.6 Francs per 
line, when computed using the observed distribution of ads as weights.  
L’Intermédiaire du capitaliste was published by the printer & manager ―Malin‖ whose translation in English is either 
‗malicious‘ or ‗clever‘. No price per line was indicated on the newspapers. On top of the ads pages, 8.57 pages of self-
promotion (69percent of the advertising surface) can be added.  
Ruy-Blas is the sole sampled newspapers to cover both fashion and entertaining activities and financial information and 
advices. Therefore, the advertisement it published comprised is clearly divided between those two. As our aim is to measure 
the ability of a newspaper to attract financial publicity, we distinguished between commercial and financial ads. Commercial   38 
ads were made by fashion shops, casinos or sea-side resorts. Financial advertisement were very similar to those of the 
standard financial periodicals. Ruy-Blas price –discriminated between the various types of financial advertising according to 
the type of announcement. As shown in line 4 of the following table, it charged the highest amount to advertisement of 
securities introduction of foreign companies on the Paris market (40 Francs per line) but only 5 Francs for announcement of 
the scheduling of shareholders‘ meetings. The average price per line was computed as the financial or commercial advertising 
revenues divided by the number of lines of each type of advertising. The section ‗Financial notices‘ included shareholders‘ 
meeting convocation and minutes of those meetings. The section ‗Financial announcements‘ included the other types of 
announcement linked to the financial market.  
 
Details on Ruy Blas  Revenues from 
financial ads (FF) 
Financial ads in 
percent of ads 
revenues 
financial ads in 
percent of advertising 
space 
Financial ads, average 
price per line (FF) 
Commercial ads, av. 
price per line (FF) 
Advertising  49 708  34.41  11.80  9.84  2.78 
Type of advertising  IPO of foreign 
companies 
IPO of domestic 
companies  Financial notices   Financial 
announcements  Total 
Price per line (FF)  40  20  5  2  n.a. 
Revenues (FF)  32 592  3 042  9 840  4 234.3  49 708.3 
Table A.5: Financial and commercial advertising in Ruy-Blas, 1
st semester of 1909.  
Source: Authors from the journal.  
 
A.4.  Estimates  of  advertising  revenues  related  to  securities  issues 
received by the French press. (Table 1) 
The payments for the Sao Paulo 5% loan need additional information. According to Le Globe, the advertising expenses of the 
1905  Sao  Paulo  loan  amounted  to  210,000  Francs.  But  a  newspaper‘s  article  published  in  L‘￩cho  des  capitalistes  (9 
December 1909) mentioned that this list is incomplete as some dailies did not appear. The archives of the syndicate leader of 
the  loan  mentioned 367,317  FF  paid  in  publicity  using  Lenoir  as the  press  broker  (Paribas archives,  folder  11  DFOM 
221/424, ―Frais d‘￩mission Emprunt 5% de l‘Etat de Sao Paulo‖). The total amount is indicated at 426,330.4 FF to which 
54688.4 FF for advertising in Amsterdam, Bruxelles and Geneva must be subtracted.  
Figure A.3. gives estimations of the amount of publicity revenues that were appropriated by the French press in relation with 
securities issues on the Paris stock exchange. To construct these estimates, we multiplied the deflated value of securities 
publicly issued in France (Saul, 2005, p. 122 using the price series of Levy-Leboyer and Bourguignon, 1985) by the share of 
advertising expenses related to the issues of securities. It is unclear whether the series of the amount of securities issues were 
compiled using the nominal value of each issue or the price offered to subscriber. Table A.6 presents the percentages for both 
type of valuation method in the case of the three loans detailed in table 1. It appears that the share of advertising expenses in 
terms of the nominal values of the securities issued is at least 0.4 percent. But the share in terms of the price paid by the 
public is somewhat higher. Figure A.3 therefore presents two estimates of the advertising revenues derived from the public 
issues of securities. The lower bound is set at 0.4 percent of the total amount while the upper bound used for the computation 
is set at 0.5 percent.  We did not used the numbers computed with the Sao Paulo loan as it was issued jointly by Paribas and a 
German bank (Dresdner) and the anti-German stance of France could explained part of this high level. In the end, the total of 
the lower bound estimates sums up at 209 millions 1913 French Francs or 654 millions of 2009 euros while the total of other 
sums at 261 millions (818 millions of 2009 Euros).  
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Figure A.3: Estimates of the amount of advertising revenues derived from securities issued in Paris received by the press 
Source: Securities publicly issued in Paris from Saul (2005, p. 122, series Stock publicly issued in France) citing Chadeau 
(1989, L‘￩conomie nationale au 19eme si￨cle) and the INSEE statistical yearbook (1951, 1961 et 1966). Nominal values 
were deflated using the price index of Levy-Leboyer and Bourguignon, 1985.    39 
    
Nominal value of 
the loan  
(millions FF) 
Paid by the public (valued 





 share of ads expenses  
(valued at nominal 
value, percent) 
 Share of ads 
expenses (valued at 
issue price, percent) 
Hungarian M. B. 1899  20  18.6  0.094525  0.47  0.51 
Bulgaria 1902  106.00  94.87  0.428877  0.40  0.45 
Sao Paulo 1905  38.239  37.47422  0.367317  0.96  0.98 
Table A.6: Share of advertising expenses in percentage of the nominal value or issue price.  
Source: Authors from Paribas archives (Bulgaria: folder 11/DFOM221-309; others: see text).  
 
A.5. Payments to newspapers during three bond issues (Table 2) 
Working with the data published by Le Globe, it appears that a company named L’auxiliaire received 80,000 FF. Research in 
the national archives (Paris, box 1 AR 108) indicated that it pooled the financial advertising business of the Economiste 
Européen, Petit Journal, Figaro, Matin, Progrès de Lyon, Petit Marseillais, Petit Provençal and France de Bordeaux. In all 
tables, we reported numbers that use the break down of the money paid to L’auxiliaire between the 5% fees for this company 
(counted in brokers) and those paid to the newspapers. Table A.7 helps to construct the percentage of table 2 using the totals 
of table A.9.  
In French Francs 
Hungarian Mortgage Bank 1899  Bulgaria 1902  Sao Paulo 1905 
Raffalovich  Non Raff.  Raffalovich  Non Raff.  Raffalovich  Non Raff. 
Political newspapers w/ circulation > 50,000  15500  5500  74000  30000  42300  10510 
Political newspapers, w/ circulation < 50,000  7500  24200  56430  60345  20500  47475 
Total political newspapers  23000  29700  130430  90345  62800  57985 
Financial newspapers  4750  18725  16500  43507  18910  17475 
Table A.7: Breakdown payments to newspapers according to circulation and whether Russia advertise in them.  
Source: Authors from Le Globe, Albert, ―La presse fran￧aise‖ and Raffalovich, L’abominable  
 
Table A.8 the descriptive statistics of the payments made to periodicals and brokers for each loan issue are given in table A.9. 
  Hungarian M.B. 1899  Bulgaria 1902  Sao Paulo 1905 
Total   94,525  428,877  213,519 
Mean  338.8  1559.6  1256 
Median  100  300  250 
Mode  25  100  25 
St. Dev.  733.8  4156.5  3602.8 
Kurstosis  24.9  31.9  42.7 
Skewness  4.5  5.1  5.9 
# observations  279  275  170 
Table A.8: Descriptive statistics on the payments to newspapers and brokers for three loan issues in Paris.  
Source: Authors from Le Globe.   
 
Finally, table A.9 presents the complete break down of the payments to the periodicals and publicity brokers for each loan 
issue. To uncover the number of table 2, some computations are necessary. It is indeed needed to distinguish among the 
political and general interest newspapers those with a circulation greater or lower than 50,000 a day. The various items under 
the heading ―Influential newspapers‖ of table 2 are also sub-categories of their respective categories in table A.8.  
Share (in percent) of each loan distributed to  Hungarian M. B. 1899  Bulgaria 1902  Sao Paulo 1905 
Publicity brokers   1.59  18.82  17.93 
Political and general interest newspapers (a)  55.75  51,48  56.56 
Local newspapers (b)  2.38  1,82  0.70 
Financial and political economy newspapers  24.83  13,99  17.04 
Group of periodicals (c)  5.29  8.26  3.04 
Specialized journal and others (d)  10.16  4.24  4.72 
Total  100  100  100 
Table A.9: Sharing of the advertising payments to newspapers and brokers.  
Source: Authors from Le Globe and various issues of the Annuaire de la presse.  
(a)  They included the dailies mentioned in table 2 (i.e. influential newspapers or those with a circulation greater than 
50,000 a day) but also the weeklies or monthlies not specialized in some specific topic. See table A.7 for a detailed 
breakdown between Raffalovich‘s paid newspapers and the other, ranked by circulation.  
(b)  This heading includes any newspaper published with a focus on a specific town or region outside Paris or on a 
Parisian neighborhood.  
(c)  Group  of  periodicals  included  either  newspapers  owned  by  the  same  person  or  those  sharing  a  joint-venture 
company to deal with advertising. It proves impossible to disaggregate the money distributed through those groups. 
(d)  The journals included under this heading included any periodical dealing with a specific topic (excluding finance 
and political economy, and political and general interest journals).  